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As a result of the concurrence of changes in the strate-
gic environment in Northeast Asia and the severe economic
recession in the defense industries, the Japanese are at a
crossroads in the formation of their future defense and
foreign policies.
From 1867 to the present time Japan has pursued a low
key foreign policy which prohibits the exportation of
weaponry. This policy was possible only because of the
Japanese reliance on the defense umbrella of the United
States and the continuing prosperity of the Japanese
economy.
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that the original
force of the ban on arms export is beginning to erode as the
twin premises on which the policy was based are in the pro-
cess of change. Evidences of this erosion are examined with
a view to determining whether the variations are temporary
and isolated or whether they are manifestations of a
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the 1980s Japan finds itself at the
crossroads in the formulation of its future defense and
foreign policies. Since the end of the Occupation in 1949,
Japan's policies have been determined by the economic
requirements of its industrial growth and by a generally low
key, passive foreign policy under the umbrella of the
defense strength of the United States. However, in view of
the present strategic environment in Northeast Asia, the
time appears to have come for Japan to reassess the value of
these policies in furthering Japan's perceived national
interests within that strategic environment.
One of the important elements of Japan's low key foreign
policies has been its position concerning arms transfers.
The production of armaments has been an integral part of
Japan's developmental process and it will undoubtedly be an
equally important part of its future development. The
dilemma which Japan faces today however, is that of formula-
ting an arms transfer policy which will not damage Japan's
international image or inhibit other facets of its export
oriented industrial structure. Since 1967 Japan's arma-
ments industries have been restrained by a governmental
policy prohibiting the exportation of weaponry.

This policy was first enunciated by Prime Minister Sato
Eisako in a speech before the National Diet wherein he
stated that his government would be guided by three basic
principles concerning arms export. Specifically, these
three principles hold that Japan will not export weapons to:
1. The Communist countries, in observation of COCOM
decisions
;
2. Countries to which UN resolutions discourage
export ; and
3. Countries likely to become party to international
disputes
.
These three principles were further expanded in 1976 when
the government of Prime Minister Miki Takeo added that:
1. Japan shall not export weapons to areas as stipula-
ted in the "Three Principles" of 1967;
2. Japan shall also refrain from exporting weapons to
areas not referred to in the "Three Principles" as
well; and
3. Japan shall consider equipment and facilities used
to manufacture weapons equivalent to weapons . *-
The above Sato-Miki principles have since formed the
cornerstone of the Japanese government's position vis-a-vis
arms transfers to the world community.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the original force
of the "Three Principles on the Export of Weapons" is
eroding due to a severe economic recession in the Japanese
defense industries and to a changing perception of the
Northeast Asian strategic environment wherein the Japanese
have begun to question, perhaps subtly, the credibility of
10

the United States* protection guarantee, as provided under
the terms of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty.
The procedure to be followed in testing this hypothesis
will be to analyze the historical background of the arma-
ments industries of Japan and Japanese policies regarding
the development of arms in response to geo-strategic
pressures which led to the enunciation of the "Three
Principles" policy. I shall investigate whether actual
Japanese transfers of arms and other military related items
and technology do in fact conform to the SATO-Miki princi-
ples. I shall look for evidence which might suggest that the
Japanese have made, or are contemplating making, departures
from these principles in actual practice. I shall then
analyze whether these variations reflect an isolated, tem-
porary situation or whether they are manifestations of the
classic consensus building process within the Japanese
government and business circles which could ultimately lead
to a modification of the basic principles theoretically
being followed at present.
Building evidence upon the analysis of the current situ-
ation within the arms industry in Japan, and considering the
changing strategic environment within Northeast Asia, I shall
then ask a fundamental question concerning whether Japan has
indeed reached a crossroads wherein it must decide whether
to continue to follow its present restricted course of
reliance upon the United States security umbrella or whether
11

it should proceed in the direction of altering its tradi-
tional postwar policy to allow it more independence of
action in choosing which options to follow in furtherance
of its perceived National security interests.
Chapter II of this thesis will examine the Japanese arms
export ban as it has been put into actual practice in recent
years with particular attention given to Japanese transac-
tions with the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the
signing of their Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. It
will also consider transfers to the Soviet Union, the
Philippines and to the Korean Peninsula in order to discover
whether or not the Japanese are relaxing their formerly strict
adherence to the "Three Principles" policy.
Chapter III will provide an overview of the Japanese con-
sensus building process and how that process may be affecting
the continued adherence to the "Three Principles" policy.
This section will look at the events and transactions of the
past three years relating to the arms export policy in an
effort to determine whether there has been a development of
consensus among the current Japanese political leadership and
the industrial hierarchy toward a modification, if not actual
retraction, of the 1967 ban.
Chapter IV will show how the present situation has
evolved by examining the historical aspects of Japan's
modernization effort which began with the Meiji restoration
in 1868. It will investigate historical Japanese responses
12

in the defense industrial field, to external and internal
pressures during the three major periods of Japanese growth
since its entry onto the international scene in 1854.
These periods are the Meiji period from 1868 to 1912, the
post-World War I era from 1914 to 1937 and the post-World
War II period from 1945 to the present. The emphasis of
this section will be to determine whether there are any
traditional response patterns common throughout each of
these three periods that might be useful to understanding
and assessing the defense- industrial policies being impl-
mented by Tokyo today.
Chapter V will examine the influence of the current
strategic environment in Northeast Asia on the consensus
building process in Japan. It will take into account the
Kurile Islands dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union;
the relationship between Japan and the events on the Korean
Peninsula; the normalization of relations with the People's
Republic of China; the overall build-up of Soviet military
forces in the Pacific region, and the perceived diminution
of United States capabilities. Consideration will also be
given to Japan's Balance of Trade problems with the Middle
East countries as a result of the continuing spiral in the
cost of energy resources and how the expansion of the arms
industry into the export sector could alleviate some of
these problems. This chapter also will examine the eco-
nomic aspects of Japan's relationship with the United
13

States and the effects which this has had on the defense
issue as Japan moves toward a more independent policy
worldwide
.
The closing chapter will be an overall evaluation of the
original hypothesis, noting the trends perceivable at
present and how these trends fit into the developing goals
of an increasingly independent Japan. It will discuss
Japan's recent actions on the world stage in light of the
geo-strategic developments taking place and will posit a
forecast of the future direction of the Japanese govern-
ment's policies concerning arms exports.
14

II. THE EXPORT BAN IN PRACTICE
The best way to judge the effectiveness and overall
applicability of a prohibitive policy such as the "Three
Principles on the Export of Weapons" is to investigate how
that policy has been implemented by those individuals and
agencies tasked with supervising the policy itself and how
those restrictions have been accepted by the individuals
and organizations directly affected by those restrictions.
In assessing the present validity of Japan's "Three
Principles", one of the factors which should be considered
first is the recent rapid technological advances which have
been achieved across the entire industrial spectrum. This
technological "revolution" has resulted in a blurring of
the fine line that separates what is civilian related tech-
nology versus what is military related, thus making any
study of specific defense industries and military industrial
related policies difficult at best. This problem was most
cogently stated by the President of Texas Instruments during
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-
committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
wherein he said:
"people don't understand what technology is, and
they do not understand the importance of protecting
it. And therefore, that puts the people who are re-
sponsible for the control of the exporting of tech-
nology in a very tight position. "^
15

Technology transfers may take place in any number of
ways, some of which being more effective than others.
Simple products can be sold directly and thus be used as
originally designed, or the product can be sold and "reverse
engineered," i.e., the product itself is analyzed so as to
determine how to build it. The Soviets have demonstrated
such a practice by buying "prototypes" and then proceeding
to manufacture their own version while ignoring the patent
rights of the original manufacturer. In addition to this
form of technology transfer, whole systems rather than just
component parts can be sold. Extending this a bit further,
whole processes or plants can be bought and installed in a
"turn key" fashion. Licensing arrangements can be worked
out to produce proprietary products or use proprietary
processes. Acquisition of available literature (open
technical or scientific literature) provides a particularly
rich source of world technical know-how on weapons related
industries. The exchange of people also, both official and
unofficial, frequently results in a transfer of technology.
It is in this gray area of arms technology transfer that
an indication of a gradual movement on the part of the
Japanese away from the "Three Principles" would most likely
occur first. Therefore the writer conducted an investiga-
tion of Japanese transactions over the past three years to
determine whether transfers of this kind had in fact been
carried out involving industrial technology with potential
16

military applications. The results of this investigation
show that the Japanese have indeed used all of the above
methods in the past three years in various arrangements
throughout the world. Most recently they have finalized
agreements relating to "gray area" technology transfers in
a variety of fields with the People's Republic of China.
However, they have not limited these transfers strictly to
the Chinese; the Soviets, the South Koreans and the North
Koreans have also been the recipients of Japanese weapons
related products or projects over the past few years.
The potential for world export of arms technology is
great, especially in regard to sales to developing countries
For example, as early as 1975 a machine industry group from
China visited Japan with a shopping list that included anti-
tank missiles, tanks, jet fighter, engines, gunnery control
devices, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, radio and
telecommunications equipment, ground radar and anti-
4
submarine patrol planes. At the time all of these requests
were turned down by the Japanese government. However, in
1977 Kawasaki Heavy Industries proposed the sale of six
V-107 helicopters (under license from the U.S.), along with
accompanying infrastructure, to Saudi Arabia. Kawasaki
contended that the helicopters were to be used for fire
fighting and emergency rescue but critics did not believe it
and thus they attacked the sale on the grounds that it
violated the ban on exports, thereby making it the first
17

acid test of the fears expressed by some Japanese critics
and editorial writers that once the rules regarding the
prohibition of arms exports are stretched there may be no
end to the process. Although criticism of the sale was
loud, it was nonetheless approved quietly by the Japanese
government and the helicopters were delivered in 1978 as
noted in the figures presented in Appendix A.
A. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The watershed in the Japanese transfer of "gray area"
technologies actually began just prior to the normalization
of relations between Japan and the People's Republic of
China. Although Prime Minister Fukuda reiterated his in-
tention to adhere to the government's principles concerning
arms exports in the Diet on the 6th of March 1978, the
Mitsibushi Corporation announced on the 5th of April that
the Mitsibushi group of companies had agreed to provide
"technical assistance" to China in developing nuclear, air-
craft and other backbone industries. The broad agreement
was intended to provide the basis for technical assistance
in building new plants and renovating old ones, as well as
in training Chinese technicians and in establishing plant
7
management and production control systems.
On the 12th of May 1978, Hitachi Ltd. said it had re-
quested permission from the Japanese government to export
to China a large electronic computer to be used for
18

geological exploration purposes, particularly in the search
for mineral resources. The company said it had received an
order from the Chinese government for an "M series type 160
II" computer and accessories, worth well over Yl billion.
One of the largest types of computers made by Japan, the
M-160 II required the approval of the Paris based Coordina-
ting Committee for Export Control (COCOM) before the sale
could go through and it therefore, marked the beginning of
a Japanese "assault" on the basic premises upon which
COCOM had been established. 8
In July 1978, just before the signing of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, Japanese arms manu-
facturers announced that they would send a mission to China
in September led by Murai Eitaro, president of the Society
of Japanese Aerospace Companies to "promote technical
exchanges and survey the Chinese weapons industry." When
asked about the export restrictions, the spokesman pointed
out that Japan would be able to supply China with precision
machinery necessary to manufacture aircraft and other items
recognized as non-weaponry. Additionally, the spokesman
noted that know-how for weapons production in China, in-
cluding factory systems, management and training in the
effective use of computers could also be provided within
the terms of the present riders. MITI, in a statement made
after the above announcement, reiterated the government's
position on the non-exportation of arms but qualified it by
19

saying that the government might allow the export of heli-
copters and flying boats for rescue operations if a COCOM
Q
sanction was given regarding the computers mounted in them.
On 31 July 1978, Hino Motors Ltd won a Chinese order for
664 heavy duty trucks and trailers worth about Y3.5 billion,
for shipment prior to the end of that year. The timing of
this order, with a very short deadline date for delivery
leads to the possible conclusion that it was made in prepa-
ration for the support of the hostilities against the
Vietnamese later that year. Also on order from the China
National Machinery Import-Export Corporation were 547 10
ton capacity general cargo trucks, 70 five-ton general
cargo trucks, 15 nine-ton dump trucks, 4 fifteen-ton dump
trucks, 10 heavy duty tractors, 10 trailers and 6 ten-ton
tank lorries for a total Chinese truck order for 197S of
3,164 units valued at ¥12 billion.
On 23 August 1978, Toshiba Corporation and Hitachi Ltd.
announced the signing of a formal contract with China
National Technology Import Corporation for the export of
an Integrated Circuit plant. Toshiba said it and Hitachi
would seek COCOM approval which they expected to receive due
to COCOM' s previous approval of an Integrated Circuit plant
to Hungary by a US company. This was the first refernce
to a technology that is vital to the development of precision
guided weapons and high accuracy delivery systems.
20

In an editorial in the Asahi Evening News on 21 August
1978, it was disclosed that customs clearance records for
the first half of the year showed that Japan-China trade in
the January-June period had increased by 16% on a yen basis
over the same period in 1977. The editorial went on to note
that "For Japan, which is arousing trade frictions all over,
Japan-China trade is one of the brightest fields and that
among industries which China was interested in concluding
agreements were such military related industries as steel
mill modernization and petrochemical development." The
article then went on to discuss the problems and obstacles
encountered by the Japanese. In reviewing the pace of
growth of China's international trade not only with Japan,
but with such other nations as the United States and the
European Community, the Asahi Shimbun stated that it felt
the time had come for restudying the COCOM restrictions.
The paper called on the government to exert extra efforts to
ease the COCOM restrictions so they will not prevent the
12
exports of industrial plants for peaceful purposes.
The first actual military contacts between the PRC and
Japan came on the 9th of September 1978 when Chang Tsai-
chien, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, held meetings
with the Japanese Joint Staff Council chairman Takashina.
Chang stated, in the spirit of signing of the peace and
friendship treaty, "Let us expedite the exchange of military
experts. Please come to China for a visit without fail."
21

A report on the visit published by Yomiuri Shimbun
,
noted
that Takashina's reply that "he would like to visit China
when he has the time," was not made merely as a diplomatic
courtesy, but noted that "among the uniformed officials
(read SDF) , there are strong voices insisting: "the enemy
of an enemy is a friend. Both Japan and China regard the
Soviet Union as a potential threat. Besides, in view of
the Sino-US rapprochment , Japan had better actively promote
14
exchanges with China."
The subject of COCOM restrictions returned to center
stage once again on 21 September 1978 when the government
announced that it would exert all efforts to secure the
relaxation of restrictions on exports to the communist bloc,
with major emphasis on some specific items to be exported
to China such as control computers and integrated circuits,
which the Japanese allege to be for peaceful purposes. The
Japanese government thinks that the relaxation of these
restrictions is indispensable for the expansion of Japan-
China trade and it wants to endeavor, above all, to secure
"special approval" for the export of some specific items it
feels cannot be used for military purposes but are nonethe-
less included on COCOM' s list of restricted items.
The first agreement between Japan and China for tech-
nology transfers directly linked to defense production
capability also came in September 1978 when Daido Special
Steel Co. of Nagoya concluded an agreement for cooperation
22

in the expanded development of a special steel mill in
China. Special steel is a material indispensable to the
defense industry. The Asahi Shimbun article which reported
this incident, noted that the Chinese had, until recently,
kept their special steel operations cloaked in a veil of
secrecy and that, by virtue of its agreement with Daido,
China appears to regard the reinforcement of its special
steel productivity as a "pressing task" and appears to have
concluded that its technology alone is not sufficient to
attain self-reliance rapidly. The article further notes that
China is looking to geographically close Japan and has
selected Daido Steel as its partner for such cooperation - a
company "whose technology is reputedly at the world's highest
level and whose enthusiasm for trade with China is well
known.
"
Japan moved on from this juncture into the realm of air-
craft manufacture technology with the return of the Murai
delegation of the Japan Aeronautical and Space Industrial
Association. Murai announced that China was interested in
purchasing YS-ll's, the first postwar aircraft built by
Japan, and because it is considered a "civilian" aircraft,
their export would not fall under the COCOM embargo even
though, with slight modifications of the doors and other




The Japanese press also revealed that Chinese officials
had indicated to this group a desire to participate with the
Japanese in the joint development of jet engines for use in
aircraft. It is believed that the Chinese are interested in
the Japanese development program of an engine for short-take'
off and landing (STOL) then being conducted by the Science
and Technology Agency under the auspices of MITI and the
1
8
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology.
Further agreements in these hazy area of modern tech-
nology were concluded between the Japanese and Chinese
throughout the remainder of 1978 and during the course of
1979. The agreements included such things as the develop-
ment of seamless steel tube plants (easily convertible to
artillery barrel production) ; Computers of all sizes for
uses ranging from meteorological observations to geophysical
studies; cargo ships of the roll-on, roll-off variety
essential for the rapid transfer of materials in port areas
with limited infrastructure such as are found in underdevel-
19
oped China; large scale integrated circuits for the pro-
duction of "electronic watches" (but with obvious




Japan has agreed to assist the PRC in the development
of its rail and highway systems and other infrastructure
related items that also have obvious military applications
as well as civilian ones. All of these developments have
24

proceeded with scant attention being paid to the "Three
Principles on the Export of Weapons". In fact, over the
three year period researched, the only LDP member to
question publicly these developments was Esaki Masumi, the
chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, who,
on 16 November 1978, expressed concern about the propriety
of offering technology, including military know-how to China
However, even he qualified his statements by noting that
although the danger of such exportation was clear, he did
say that if China were to become an important market for
American military weapons after the normalization of US-
China relations, then Japan would be forced to "study
countermeasures" , thus hinting at the possibility of Japan's
delivery of military weapons, as distinguished from military
21technology to China in the somewhat distant future."
B. THE SOVIET UNION
While China appears to have been the focus for the
recent apparent violations of the arms export ban, it was
by no means the only recipient of Japanese largesse in the
realm of weapons-related technology transfers. In January
1978, the USSR ordered a mammoth floating drydock from
Ishikawaj ima-Harima Heavy Industries, sufficient in size to
accommodate vessels up to 80,000 tons. The sale of this
floating dock was approved by the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and delivered to the
25

Soviet Union for use at Vladivostok in 1979 in time to pro-
vide services to the newest additions to the Soviet Far
Eastern Fleet, her ASW carrier MINSK, and the latest Soviet .
class of amphibious ship, the IVAN ROGOV. This sale was
completed successfully in spite of the concern expressed
about its military uses not only within Japan but by
Western nations as well.
In addition to the floating drydock for the MINSK, the
Soviet Union also received medium sized computer systems
from Nippon Electric Co., and television relay systems with




In July 1978, the National Defense Department of the
Philippines revealed that it was importing parts for hand-
grenades from Japan, thereby becoming the first foreign
government to officially confirm that arms had been imported
from Japan. The importation practice surfaced due to the
discovery of some 2,000 safety pins for grenades in three
boxes among baggage arriving at Manila from Narita airport
in Japan. Checks by customs officials revealed that the
baggage belonged to Kanazawa Kazuo, president of Fuji
Industrial Co.
While the debate over the grenade parts was raging a
further disclosure by Philippines naval authorities that
26

12 LST's also had been imported from Japan for use in the
country's regional economic development program, thereby
adding fuel to an unwanted fire in the Japanese Diet and
press. In confirming the fact that the LST's had, in fact,
been exported to the Philippines under government sanction,
MITI stressed that they were LST's of "the old type" which
belonged to the US but had been loaned to the Japanese
Maritime Self Defense Forces. Naval authorities said they
had been repaired at Sasebo so they could be used to haul
construction materials and that they were unfit for combat
duty. Nevertheless, the damage had been done to the pre-
23
viously quiet circumvention of the export ban.
On 10 October 1978, the Tokyo Distric Public
Prosecutor's Office indicted Kanazawa for smuggling parts
of hand grenades to the Philippines. Kanazawa was charged
with exporting a total of 897,295 pieces of hand grenade
fuse to the Philippines in three shipments beginning in
1976 without the approval of the Ministry of International
24Trade and Industry. In discussions with the Asahi Shimbum
Washington Office on November 26, 1980 it was learned that
Kanazawa was convicted of smuggling on 16 March 1979 at
Tokyo District Court. A sentence of 1 year and 6 months in
prison was suspended in lieu of a 6 month probationary




D. THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The possibility of further Japanese circumvention of
Tokyo's arms export restrictions also exists with regard :
to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Japan has
maintained continuous contacts with the Kim Il-sung
regime in the post-war period in spite of its close alli-
ance with the United States and ties to the ROK. There is
still a large Korean population within Japan with ties to
the north and there are small but active lobbies within
the Diet and business communities working toward a widen-
ing of the relationship between the two countries. Even
though the North Koreans have repeatedly defaulted on
repayment of loans and other contractual obligations with
the Japanese, trade continues with minimal disruption.
Twice during the past three years, Japan sent teams of
negotiators to North Korea to reach accommodation on a
repayment schedule. Both times it was decided in favor of
the North Koreans
.
Overall, Japan has been assisting in the industrial
modernization and development of the North Korean economy,
generally in the heavy industry sector, in return for
agreements on obtaining needed raw materials. However, in
November 1979 it was disclosed that Japan had been shipping
such items as portable radio transceivers, high speed motor
boats and large quantities of rubber wet suits to the North
Korean government. This blatant export of directly
28

related military equipment to a "hostile" regime which
poses a potential threat to the stability of the Korean
Peninsula and indirectly to Japan itself, received scant
mention in the Diet and disappeared from newsprint within
25two days of its appearance.
Japan's reasons for maintaining its economic ties with
North Korea in the face of severe fiscal uncertainties
stems from its desire to prevent any large scale renewal
of military conflict on the Peninsula in which Japan could
become directly or indirectly involved as an offshoot of
the Japan-United States Security Treaty. To further this
objective, Japan has chosen to follow a two Korea policy
wherein it hopes to be able to exert a moderating and re-
straining influence on both sides of the demilitarized
zone so as to maintain peace and stability. In so doing it
not only allows the Japanese government to control the
divisions within the Japanese body politic over the
Korean question, it also is useful for their promotion of
an equidistance policy in international affairs.
E. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The question of Japanese gray area technology transfers
is particularly obtuse when the Republic of Korea is con-
sidered. Since normalizing relations in 1965, Japan has
become South Korea's major trading partner and an impor-
tant source of economic support. Japan accounted for 31
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percent of South Korea's total trade in 1977 compared to
28 percent for the United States. Japan also has become
the major source of foreign investment in South Korea,
funneling approximately $500 million into the country in the
27first 10 years after the normalization of relations. It
was Japanese money therefore that provided the Park Chung
Hee government with the foreign exchange necessary to re-
build its stagnating economy and set it off on the road
to economic success. What is interesting in this relation-
ship is that although there are deep cultural animosities
and ethnic prejudices between Korean and Japanese, they have
nonetheless been able to overlook them in the interest of
mutual economic growth. The result of this arrangement has
been an extensive flow of trade and investment from Japan to
Korea both visibly through outright equity investments and
less visibly by their unofficial control of South Korean
enterprises through dummy partners and technical assistance
or licensing agreements.
While there are no specific examples of outright gray
area technology transfers recently from Japan to South
Korea one cannot overlook the growing interdependence
between the two economies. Money and technical expertise
flows back and forth across the Tsushima Straits as Japan
restructures its own economy in the face of changing market
forces and as South Korea continues to expand its economic
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modernization efforts. The result of this growing eco-
nomic interdependence is that Japan has been a major sub-
sidizer of South Korea's armaments industries. Therefore,
while Japan still professes to follow the prohibitions
against actual arms transfers it nonetheless provides
extensive funding for the growth of the largest arms pro-
ducing nation in the non-communist Asian world.
In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that there is
a movement on the part of both the Japanese government and
the Japanese business circles away from a strict interpre-
tation of the thirteen year old ban on the exportation of
armaments. Where it will ultimately stop will be deter-
mined by a multitude of factors which are impinging on the
Japanese decision making process. Factors such as the
economic recession, Soviet aggressiveness, Japanese eco-
nomic competitiveness and not the least important, American
leadership and diplomacy. The following section will look
at how decisions allowing circumvention of the arms export
ban are formulated within the Japanese government. In
particular, it will address the importance of consensus
politics in Japan and how this process impinges on the




As noted in the preceding section, any prohibitive; policy
such as the "Three Principles on the Export of Weapons" is
only as effective as the individual and agencies charged
with carrying out that policy make it. This section will
look at this aspect of the Japanese decision-making process
paying particular attention to the consensus style politics.
We shall seek to demonstrate that any modification or re-
nouncement of the "Three Principles" will only occur after
a lengthy period consensus development within the government,
business and public sectors.
Whereas Article 9 of the Constitution was imposed upon
a vanquished Japan as a means of ensuring that it would
never again regain its military potency, the "Three
Principles on the Export of Weapons'*' was a conscious policy
decision taken by a Japanese government in 1967 in an effort
to offset the fears in the world community of a Japan
returning to a higher level of military capability and of
its becoming a "Merchant of Death" and contributor to the
war then raging in Vietnam. Japan in 1967 was enjoying the
benefits of a burgeoning economy and anything that could
upset the delicate balance that had been achieved in
attaining this resurgence was to be avoided. This sensi-
tivity to world public opinion remains as potent today as
it was in 1967 and is the driving force behind the gradual
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approach to change that is being pursued in Japan
today.
The Japanese abhor any precipitate change in the status
quo due to the disruptive societal influences that would
normally flow from such an action. They therefore prefer
change only after carefully orchestrated development of
attitudes and opinions of the individuals involved away
from the previous policy stance toward acceptance of the
new policy. By virtue of such an orderly process "face" is
preserved and societal disruptions are kept to a minimum.
In view of Japan's vulnerable position in the World order
of nations both economically and militarily, such a gradual
form of change with regard to its arms transfer policies
is the only option open to it if it is to maintain a
facade of neutrality in world affairs.
A. SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF JAPAN'S
CONSENSUS STYLE POLITICS
The consensus building process in Japan is part of the
political tradition of the country that evolved over
centuries and has been perfected since Meiji times. Open
confrontations are to be avoided in Japan so as to reduce
risks, save "face" and to insulate the government, politi-
cal party or other organization or person from potential
criticism or attack. The Japaiese have demonstrated a
proclivity for extensive behind-the-scenes maneuvering,
initial sounding out processes, a penchant for meticulous
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planning and a conspicuous distaste for premature commit-
ment. They prefer pragmatic, low risk situations and
approaches to particular subjects, especially in regard to
the usually volatile defense issues, and prefer, if at all
possible, to stack the deck in advance to guarantee success
by creating situations of strength through various pre-
liminary arrangements leading to the presentation of a fait
accomplis
.
In support of such tactics, the Japanese use a building
block approach that begins by a discussion of a limited
range of subjects followed by a mobilization of public
opinion both internally within Japan and externally if the
subject has international overtones. Since the beginning
of modern Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, there has
been a dread of interference from mane powerful countries.
The Japanese, especially since the end of World War II,
are extremely sensitive to foreign public and governmental
opinion or to direct power confrontations, any one of which
could have disastrous consequences for their highly vulner-
able economic system. For this reason any change in the
status quo , especially in regard to the liberalization of
the arms export ban, will be taken gradually in a step by
step, building block approach, until consensus on the part
of the Japanese public is fully obtained and world public
opinion is sufficiently assuaged so as to preclude any
2 8
adverse impact on its economic lifelines.
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The effort by the industrial and business community to
develop a consensus about reversing the "Three Principles
on the Export of Weapons" began in earnest in late 1975 and
early 1976. Hard hit by the recession in both overseas and
domestic markets, the industrial leadership felt that the
export of weapons could serve as a lubricant for increased
sales particularly to the Middle Eastern countries. Tanabe
Bunichiro, then president of Mitsibishi Corporation, Japan's
biggest trading house, proposed that exports of "those which
may not be 'pure' arms but are 'near' to them" should be
allowed. Kono Fumihiko, former president of Mitsibishi
Heavy Industries and then chairman of the Defense Production
Committee of the Keidanren (the Japanese Federation of
Economic Organization) also stated that the technology of
arms production should be available for export. Finally,
Taguchi Renzo, chairman of Ishikawaj ima-Harima Heavy
Industries suggested that arms exports were a "strong
inducement" for promoting exports of industrial plant to
29developing countries.
Arguing further that the export of arms and ammunition
would be just the tonic for the sluggish Japanese economy,
industrialists at the time loudly criticized the government
weapons embargo as "absurd and unrealistic". Kono
Fumihiko stated further that:
"Arms exports will enable Japan to obtain oil.
Oil producing nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia
want weapons rather than industrial plants. Japan
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pays huge amounts of foreign exchange to oil producing
countries to buy their oil but there's very little they
want to buy from Japan. Japan is the only major indus-
trial power which does not use weapons as a means of
obtaining oil.
Arms exports are needed unavoidably to get oil...
I think people in the opposition camp should agree with
us because after all we're not going to be the Salesmen
of death." 31
Business leaders pointed out at the time that Japan had lost
out in a number of lucrative international contracts because
of its inability to export arms. The examples given inclu-
ded the loss of a $324.7 million communications system
contract in Iran to the US as a result of a US offered
"package deal" which included badly needed arms and a similar
defeat at the hands of the USSR in Iraq for a $650 million
32thermal power plant.
At the time that these first calls for liberalization of
the export ban policy, the government of then Prime Minister
Miki Takeo stated that it would not permit Japan to export
arms as long as it was in power. Miki reportedly feared
damage to Japan's international reputation as a peaceful
nation that avoids taking sides in disputes. The controversy
however, did not end at this point. As Richard Halloran
pointed out in an article for the New York Times , the busi-
ness community was the main source of political funds for
Miki's conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and that
"deliberations like this in Japan have a way of going on
until a compromise and consensus was reached."
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B. JAPANESE GOVERNMENT - BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
Before proceeding in my discussion of the observable
manifestations of the gradual consensus building effort, a
careful scrutiny of the interrelationship between the govern-
ment and business community, as suggested in the Halloran
article, is in order. To begin with, organized business has
a long history of intimate involvement in the political life
of Japan.
In 1952, faced with increasing political instability and
fearful of the consequences if a socialist government were
to be formed, the business community, as represented by the
Federation of Economic Organizations ( Keidanren ) , the Japan
Federation of Employer's Associations ( Nikkeiren ) , the Japan
Committee for Economic Development ( Keizai Doyukai ) and the
Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry ( Nissho ) , emphatically
and unequivocably expressed their views to the government
regarding the necessity for stability and order:
"Although a year has already elapsed since the re-
gaining of independence, the firm establishment of an
independent national economy is still far away. Unless
a long-term policy is adopted and carried out vigorously,
it could lead to a serious situation. Since a strong
and stable government is needed to cope with the present
crisis, the political parties should, in as much as there
is no great difference among them in their basic policies
and objectives, eschew emotion, discuss issues frankly,




Large amounts of financial contributions began to be dis-
tributed to the party organizations and individual
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politicians in order to bolster the chances of the con-
servative merger. The Zaikai leadership, as the top execu-
tives of the aforementioned business organizations are
referred to, were determined that organized business should
assume responsiblity in advancing the healthy development
of the national economy. Soon after the formation of the
LDP in November 15, 1955, the Zaikai further clarified what
they expected of the new LDP, and also that of the largest
opposition party, the Japan Socialists. They called for the
stabilization of the political situation, and the achieve-
ment of economic independence and economic viability.
In the 10 year period following the merger of the
equally conservative Liberals and Democrats, the business
community exercised an enormous amount of coercive power
over the governmental apparatus mainly as a result of their
extensive financial support. The power of life and death
over the government was never so strong as it was during
this decade in that it was an accepted fact that no candi-
date for the premiership could be successful without the
tacit, if not expressed approval of the business community.
Nor could a Prime Minister long continue in his post after
he had lost the support of organized business.
Unlike the old zaibatsu of the prewar days the new post-
war big business structure is composed of enterprise groups.
These groups are of two kinds: those organized around the
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former zaibatsu and using the old names (Mitsubishi with 38
separate corporations and a research institute; Mitsui with
22 corporations; Sumitomo with 15 corporations) and those
held together by large banks (Fuji, formerly Yasuda; Daiichi;
and the Industrial Bank of Japan, through which the enter-
37prises in both groups manage their financing)
.
These groups are not monopolies, at least not so as the
word "monopoly" is understood in the West. They are instead
horizontal groups of companies, each containing many and
varied types of companies and industries as well as a bank,
a trust company, insurance companies, a trade company and a
real estate company. Member companies tend to compete with
other companies external to their group and to cooperate
with those that are internal. Policy coordination is gener-
ally accomplished thrugh president's clubs, which meet
periodically.
Another contrast between the pre- and the postwar
zaibatsu is that none of these groups has a holding company
at the top to control the various enterprises. There has
been a re-concentration of economic power but the present
setup is very different from the setup before the war in
structure and operation. Groups are held together by inter-
locking directorates and corporate stock ownership, as well
as by inter-personal ties through president's clubs and
38
other organizations. In order for the zaikai therefore to
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be able to present a united front on issues and problems in
their relations with the governmental apparatus, the co-
operation of the four key organizations ( Keidanren , Hikkeiren -,
Keizai Doyukai and Nissho ) has been indispensable in achiev-
39ing consensus amongst the member groups.
The political influence of organized business has, how-
ever,, diminished somewhat, beginning with the arrival of Sato
Eisako as Prime Minister in 1964. Sato diversified his power
base and successfully reduced the former stranglehold over
politics which the organized business community had previously
enjoyed. Their influence was further diminished by Sato's
successor Tanaka Kakuei, a selfmade millionaire and profes-
sional politician who had succeeded with minimal aid and
assistance from the big business clique. '
Yet another major factor contributing to this decline
in influence was the fact that Japan's position as the third
largest economic power in the world in terms of GNP had
created enormous pressures on the government that conflicted
with business interests. International pressures for greater
and faster liberalization and for "orderly marketing" and
domestic pressures for improving the quality of life rather
than simply expanding the size of the economy are testing,
for the first time, the capacity of the Japanese political




Although the power of the business community over the
government has been somewhat diminished it still remains one
of the prime factors in the determination of policy. One of
the most striking features of the LDP is the extent of its
dependence on big business contributions for its financial
support and the degree to which the sources and amount of
that support are hidden from public view. In a society that
traditionally has its own norms of exerting influence, it
is noteworthy the extent to which extensive illegal financing
of the political activities of politicians and political
parties has become an integral part of the political system.
In the case of big business' political contributions there
is an apparent trend away from efforts to coordinate
business contributions and an increase in the development of
ties between individual factions and particular business
conglomerates. Rather than reinforcing an image of Japan,
Inc., such a trend threatens to revive in a new form a pre-
war funding pattern in which conservative political parties
41
received support from different large business enterprises.
This extensive financial backing arrangement has reinforced
the marriage of convenience between business and politics
in Japan. The main business of business is politics and
vice versa, in that politicians, if they are to continue
their career in politics must be concerned with economics.
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C. EFFECTS OF JAPANESE "BATSU"
Interconnected with this symbiotic relationshp between
big business and politics is another unique Japanese social
system, that of the "batsu" or cliques. It is within this
system that the modern Japanese version of the Confucian
" oyabun-kobun " concept or parent-child relationships exist.
Virtually all Japanese are connected in one way or another
with several batsu . The more important of these in relation
to the defense issue are the pre-war, gumbatsu or military
cliques and zaibatsu or business cliques, known in the post-
war era as zaikai ; the kanbatsu or bureaucratic cliques; the
gakubatsu , or school associated cliques, and the regional
affiliations such as the Kyodo batsu , like the Gumma Prefec-
ture clique which includes Fukuda Takeo and Nakasone
Yasuhiro. Finally there is the keibatsu or family associated
cliques
.
Within these cliques functions the vertically oriented
Japanese society in which the concept of " giri " is all im-
portant in the conduct of personal relations. Giri is a
form of moral and personal debt owed to someone else for
favors received and it is a social custom which can function
both up and down the hierarchical structure of Japanese
society. All of these cliques form part of the basis of




The businessman and the politician can be connected
through family ties ( keibatsu ) , school ties ( gakubatsu ) , or
regional affiliations in any one of which a debt of giri may
be.owed which some day will have to be paid. In order to
demonstrate what such a system means I have included as
Appendix D an outline of some of former Prime Minister
Ohira Masayoshi's connections in the political and business
world. Without the support of these connections it is
doubtful that Ohira could have functioned effectively as
Prime Minister. It is within this clique system that the
Japanese lobby system functions to influence the outcome of
policy decisions and it is therefore within this system that
the success or failure of the consensus campaign for loosen-
ing the restrictions on the exportation of weapons will be
won or lost.
With this then as a background to the political environ-
ment it is clear that there is a multiplicity of actors
within the Japanese political system which can have an im-
pact on the outcome of this debate and therefore prudence
dictates that the process begin slowly and cautiously so as
not to offend those opposition and internal elements fear-
ful of a return to pre-war militarism nor to offend the
vox populi themselves. As Professor Robert Scalapino has
noted:
"Japanese politicians have become, for better or
worse, public-opinion minded. To the extent that
pollsters reports are becoming a major source of the
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policy-maker's knowledge about public opinion, it
may be reasonably assumed that the people's voice,
as reflected in the polls, is affecting the decision-
maker's perception of important policy issues and
their assessment of feasible responses to those
issues . '"*2
D. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE ARMS TRANSFER CONSENSUS
BUILDING PROCESS
Returning to Halloran's original thesis that delibera-
tions have a way of going on until a compromise and con-
sensus is reached, a review of the events since 1975 will
demonstrate that the deliberations have in fact continued
and are well on their way to fruition.
Soon after the collapse of Vietnam in 1975, interest
in Japan's defense capability perked up. On 21 July 1975
an article appeared in the Baltimore Sun titled "Tokyo
Arms Industry: Low-Profile Boom" in which the author,
Matthew Seiden, noted that "Despite a Constitutional ban on
maintaining armed forces and a government edict forbidding
the export of military weapons, the unpublicized and little
known Japanese arms industry has grown quietly into at
least a billion dollar a year business." The author further
remarked that "while the industry remains small and unso-
phisticated compared to that of the US and Soviet Union, it
nonetheless was far better established than most foreigners
or Japanese realized," and although limited at present to
producing basically for the needs of the Self Defense
Forces, the present technology level was sufficient to
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provide the potential for drastically increasing the out-
put of most items on very short notice.
The article states that in many cases, companies like
Mitsubishi have simply reactivated their old wartime plants,
often using the same employees who worked there before and
during the war and that the arms producers have tried to
avoid publicity by building plants in inaccessible places,
using factories that also produce unmistakeably non-
military products, and labeling their military products
with misleading euphemisms, such as Mitsubishi's title of
'Special Vehicles Division' for its tank production facility
The most telling parts in the article, however, were the
public disclosure that Japan in 1975 made more than 90% of
its own arms, a great deal of which is produced under
license agreements. It also notes that the Japanese
government has shown repeatedly that, rather than save money
on bargain imports, it was willing to pay more for wholly
Japanese made products that would make the country less
dependent on foreign military supplies. Seiden then
closed the article with a then unsubstantiated allegation
that the Japanese arms producers circumvent the anti-
exportation restriction and had actually sold helicopters,
and other equipment for allegedly non-military, police or
43
commercial use in Sweden, Thailand and elsewhere.
The defense debate picked up once again in September
1975 during the visit of then Secretary of Defense James
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Schlesinger to Tokyo. Schlesinger declared that Japan's
Self Defense Forces (SDF) were inadequate and that they
should be strengthened to share defense tasks more fairly
with the United States. He noted that because of "aging
equipment" and a shortage of ammunition and supplies, the
SDF were incapable of fulfilling their mission to defend
the Japanese islands. Schlesinger stated that the Japanese
had been "too passive" a partner in the US-Japan Security
Pact and that over the next few years the SDF should be ex-




Following Schlesinger ' s visit, the debate in Japan
widened from the purely defensive realm concerning how much
is enough and how new should the SDF be, toward the general
question of the anti-exportation ban itself. The first
articles concerning this aspect were those by Halloran of
the New York Times and Yates of the Chicago Tribune noted
at the beginning of this section. By May of 1976 the con-
troversy had spread further to include the American-written,
postwar Japanese Constitution. In attempting to celebrate
the first ever official Constitution Day with ceremonies
marking the 29th anniversary of the document, only 700 of
the 1000 invited guests showed up for the ceremony which
45lasted only 15 of a scheduled 30 minutes.
The first actual governmental mention of a consensus
building process occurred in August 1976 by the then
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Defense Minister Sakata Michita who, noting that part of
Japan's problem in trying to revise its defense policies
had been a lack of public enthusiasm, stated that "one of
my most important tasks is to get a national consensus on
defense." 46
The debate and consensus building process continued un-
abated through 1977, albeit at a somewhat quieter level.
The major topic seemed to have been in reference to the
American perception that Japan had been "getting a free
ride" from the Mutual Security Treaty. It appears that 1977
was actually a watershed period in the Japanese defense
policy debates.
With the steady reduction of the LDP's monopoly in the
Diet, the opposition parties were forced to begin a reasses-
sment of their previously unrealistic positions vis-a-vis
the Security Treaty and the SDF. With the prospect of
power in sight and an aroused public to placate, socialists
and communists alike, began toning down their pacifist
programs. The LDP meanwhile began taking a serious look at
defense, reviewing the outdated approaches to operational
planning and abandoning the ad hoc approach to planning
which had deprived the SDF of the objectives and motiva-
tions essential to maintaining military efficiency in
peacetime. The biggest political headache of the year,
however, was the unfolding of the Lockheed bribery scandal,

which cast a pale over the defense issues, especially those
relating to big business ties to defense production. The
lack of data regarding the anti-exportation ban during this .
period appears to suggest that this subject was put on the
back burner while awaiting the Lockheed affairs to die down
4 7
so as to minimize any adverse public reactions thereto.
In March of 1978, an editorial appeared in the Asahi
Evening News which returned the arms export ban issue to
the center stage. The editorial noted that Doko Toshio,
then president of Keidanren and Nagano Chigeo of the Japan
Chamber of Commerce and Industry ( Nissho ) , had both made
statements calling on the government for flexible implemen-
tation of the arms export ban. The Asahi paper noted that
voices such as these were once again becoming stronger as
a result of the prolongation of the recession and urged
that the government and business community exert self-
restraint so as to not endanger Asian peace in general and
Japan's world reputation and respectability in particular.
The editorial asserts that Doko and Nagano are not request-
ing the outright rescinding of the ban, but rather, a more
flexible interpretation of the term "arms." "According
to unified opinion" says the article, "arms are those thing
used by the armed forces and used directly in fighting."
In more concrete terms, this means guns, cannon, ammunition,
explosives, military vehicles, military ships and their
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parts, as stipulated in the separate list of the Export
Trade Control Ordinance.
However, on the basis of this list it is difficult to
judge whether ships and trucks which do not carry weapons
are "arms." Faced with a "structural recession" and pros-
pects of widespread unemployment, shipbuilding unions have
demanded relaxation of the ban, taking the view that such
non-combatant vessels as survey ships and icebreakers should
not be regarded as weapons even if they are used as part of
in * 48
a naval fleet.
According to the editorial, the official policy stance
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
is that when an export request is received it has no alter-
native but to judge each case according to the importing
country, use, structure and performance. In conclusion,
the article once again lamented that they fear that once the
brakes are removed, there is the possiblity that the inter-
pretation will be expanded without limit, saying next that
defensive weapons are alright or that transport means are
i 49okay.
Closely following this editorial was another contained
in Mainichi on 19 March 1978 which noted that the campaign
was being spearheaded in the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe ( Kansai ) area
by the Kansai committee for Economic Development and the
Kansai Economic Federation and that a study committee had
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been established in 1977 to carefully feel out public
opinion. Assured that they were on safe ground, about 250
influential business leaders went at the subject of defense,
head on in an open discussion at their annual convention
led by the Federation's president Hyuga Hosai, the chairman
of Sumitomo Metal Industries. Buoyed by the then Prime
Minister Fukuda Takeo's first mention of defense in an
opening session of the Diet in late January, Hyuga noted
that the first step to be taken should be "to try to draw
a picture of what our national defense should be, by dis-
cussing the problem in public." The article further states
that, although the defense problem had been viewed from
many angles, such as education, the free enterprise system,
the behavior pattern of the Japanese and patriotism, the
dominant feeling in the business community is that a strong
defense capability is vital to protect the free trade
50
system.
Increasing Russian aggressiveness in Northeast Asia,
and the announcement by the Carter Administration of its
intention to stage a phased withdrawal of troops from the
Korean Peninsula heightened a feeling of anxiety within
Japan over its defense capabilities in respect to protec-
ting the home island. This facet of Japan's dilemma re-
garding its armaments policies will be treated in a later
section. Suffice to say at this point that the anxieties
caused by external developments has raised the level of the
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debate internally. This level was also further increased
by the publication of various articles in the press and
magazines directed against the Soviet Union, articles urged -
on by business interests eager for more defense spending.
For example, the Tokyo Shimbun speculated that the only
foreign power that could mount a naval invasion of Japan was
the Soviet Union, and that if it did so, its forces would
land on the northern beaches of Hokkaido. Yomiuri Shimbun
reported on its front page that officials no longer believed
the United States had the power to defend Japan. The
Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency at the time,
Kanemaru Shin, even speculated before a seminar at the
Keidanren that Japan had nothing more than bamboo spears
•
- u- 51against machine guns.
By virtue of the increasingly open dialogue in the Diet,
the level of awareness and acceptance on the part of the
Japanese people was increased substantially on the subject
of Japan's military forces. This has also had a visible
effect upon the SDF itself in that the leadership is be-
coming more and more aggressive in its demands as spending
on defense increases. The military has slowly emerged from
the background and are becoming more and more comfortable
in their place in Japanese society. They seem to sense a
renewed respectability and are therefore beginning to
assert themselves more forcefully in stating their position
on defense issues, such as operational procedures, combined
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arms training, increased at sea training between the
Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) and USN units based at
Yokosuka and most recently, by participating for the first
time in the annual RINPAC exercises with the combined naval
and marine units of Canada, the United States.,. Australia
and Great Britain.
The major event of 1978 however, was the signing of the
Sino- Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty after six years of
patient negotiation. The results of this treaty were aptly
described by John Roche of the Washington Star when he
wrote
:
"Symbolically, Japan has once again launched her-
self as an Asian power after living with the myth of
' Trilateralism, ' with the illusion that she, the U.S.
and the EEC had a supra-regional common interest.
When the Soviets protested Japanese acceptance of
(slightly camouflaged) ' anti-hegonism, ' the latter in
essence replied that they took this pledge at least as
seriously as the Russians did Helsinki ' s human rights
guarantees
!
In other words, for better or worse, the Japanese
have not forgotten how to play hard ball, and the
thought of 900 million intelligent, mobilized Chinese
working in tandem with Japan's superb technological
assets must terrify the Kremlin. "52
The political and economic ramifications of this treaty
for Japan are immense and have been enhanced even further
by the normalization of relations between the United States
and China and the ascendancy of the moderate, pragmatic
element within China, led by Deng Hsiao Ping who are dedi-
cated to the modernization of China. It is in this area of
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Northeast Asia that the arms producers and industrial
giants have concentrated their efforts in whittling down the
parameters of the arms export ban.
The consensus building process on the overall question
of the acceptance of things military continued into the 80s
in Japan in a very visible way. The taboos concerning public
discussion of the topic have disappeared as more and more
people become aware of Japan's vulnerable position in the
world and as renewed nationalism begins to develop as a
result of external pressures against Japan's cultural homo-
geneity and distinctive operating style in the international
arena. Feelings of stress are once again being felt and
appropriate adaptive and coping responses are once again
being actively sought. The following section will look at
the historical foundations of Japan's defense industries and
their reactions to both external and internal pressures to
determine whether there are any traditional response patterns
common throughout their historical experiences which might
be useful in assessing the direction which future responses
and policies could take.
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IV. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY
"Threats are anticipations of approaching harm that
trigger feelings of stress that lead to responses^
generally known as coping or adaptive behavior. "53
The Japanese armaments industries are not separate and
distinct businesses which function independently within the
Japanese industrial complex. Rather, they are on the whole,
subsidiary entities of the larger pre-war zaibatsu and post-
World War II trade conglomerates and therefore any discus-
sion or study of these industries must necessarily consider
the overall milieu within which they must operate.
One of the important characteristics of this Japanese
industrial structure that must be continually kept in mind
is that Japan is an Asian country, with an Asian psychology,
operating in a predominantly Western political and economic
environment. Although Tokyo may outwardly resemble such
Western metropolises as New York, Chicago and London, be-
neath the surface lay centuries of Asian traditions and
biases which interact with latter day Western influences to
produce the Japan of today.
One of the most striking elements of the Japanese tradi-
tion is its sense of cultural identity, a feeling of unique-
ness which they consider sets them apart from both Western
and other Asian societies. It is this same sense of unique-
ness and separateness that is acting upon the Japan of 1980
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that acted upon the Japan of the 1840s. There is again a
sense of threat being felt among the Japanese populace
which, as the quotation above suggests, is "triggering
feelings of stress" that will lead to further adaptive re-
sponses by the Japanese leadership.
The lessons of Japan's history since the overthrow of
the Tokugaw Shogunate have not been lost on the modern
Japanese and indeed there are striking parallels which can
be drawn, and which must be considered, when assessing the
future of Japan's armaments industries and their potential
for future exports.
The evolutionary history of Japan's defense industries
begins in the pre-Meiji era and with the subsequent Meiji
reform policies which were designed to raise Japan to a
level of equality and modernity with the Western world
while at the same time maintaining control of their cultural
and political destiny. The Meiji policies of industrial
promotion and import protection were so successful that
Japan was able to prevent the ravages of its economy and
people like those that befell China, thereby enabling it to
become a major world power within the short span of only 50
years
.
The Japan of 1980 is again faced with threats to its
existence in the areas of raw materials and energy resource
availability; an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union that
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flaunts its might in menacing gestures on Japan's peri-
phery; an unstable Korean Peninsula and perceptions of a
weakened United States, Japan's main ally and source of
strength and protection since the end of the Great East
Asian War in 1945. Added to these external fears are the
leadership changes within Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) and the economic recession and inflationary
trend which is affecting the lives of its people and
threatening the success and achievements that have marked
Japan's history since the overthrow of the Tokugawa
Shogunate in 1868.
A review of the parallels between the Japan of 1980 and
the Japan of the late 1800s therefore is considered essen-
tial in order to draw inferences regarding potential future
moves by the Japanese leadership to cope with these current
"threats" to Japan's existence.
A. THE TOKUGAWA LEGACY
In 1842 when the precedent of the impact of the West on
China became visible in Japan, Japan was an isolated island
chain closed off from the rest of the world for over two
hundred years. The ruling Tokugawa Shogunate had been so
successful in their policy of isolation that Japan had all
but dropped out of the consciousness of the Europeans, the
only important exception was the annual Dutch vessel from
the East Indies to the Dutch trading post on the island of
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Deshima in Nagasaki harbor. As a result of increased
Western activity along the Chinese coast, particularly in
the form of New England whaling ships, attention was once
again drawn to Japan and demands began to grow in the West
that Japan open its doors to Western commercial and diplo-
matic contacts.
During the isolation period before 1848 the Tokugawa
Shogunate had unified the country and had turned it into a
feudal state utilizing Confucian philosophy as its ideolo-
gical basis. The policies of the Tokugawa Shoguns were
designed to maintain the status quo that existed, and,
although they could not totally prevent change in Japan,
they did succeed for over two centuries in preserving a
cast-bound legal and political framework of Japanese society
The most important aspect of Shogunal rule however, was the
54fact that they were successful in maintaining the peace.
A succinct description of Japanese society in 1856 was pro-
vided by Townsend Harris when he arrived in Japan as the
first Consul General of the United States. In his diary he
aptly observed the condition of Japanese society as one
where the proverb 'move not that which is still 1 was being
faithfully observed.
Three major factors however, emerged from this period
of self-imposed isolation that were to have profound ef-
fects on Japan's later modernization efforts. First,
Japans culture and sense of national identity had been
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strengthened by the minimization of foreign influences and
over two hundred years of peaceful coexistence. Second, a
strong tradition of centralized government had been esta-
blished by the Tokugawa Shoguns when they consolidated their
rule. Third, an active and wealthy merchant class had evol-
ved around the Shogunal center of power at Edo (Tokyo)
.
This merchant class had been tacitly accepted by the ruling
Samurai and Daimyo and had thus achieved grudging social
respectability, and no small amount of political power, as
a result of increasing court debts. It was a combination
of this merchant class and some unusually entrepreneurial
Samurai that would emerge as the driving forces behind
Japan's modernization efforts during the latter half of
the 19th Century.
Although the Japanese had shut themselves off from the
world, they were by no means oblivious to the events which
were occuring in China and the rest of the world. By
utilizing the Dutch "window" to the West, the Japanese
leadership watched with interest and alarm the unfolding
of events in and around the Chinese mainland. Up until this
point the Japanese leaders had remained committed to the
traditional policy of isolation and they opposed any capitu-
lation to what seemed to them to be affronts to Japan's
national dignity . Now, however, the question of whether to
open Japan's "doors" in the face of increased Western
pressure became the central issue confronting the Japanese
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leadership and which subsequently led to the downfall of the
Tokugawa Shogunate.
The Japanese came to feel that their independence was
being threatened. This was a way of thinking, not in terms
of their personal family or clan, but in terms of the
"national family." The maintenance of their independence
had become their most important national purpose.
As a result of this concern, the period between 1842 and
the downfall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868 was marked by
bitter confrontations among the ruling Daimyo about how to
respond to the Western incursions so as to preserve Japanese
independence against the threat of Western domination. It
was clear to observers that foreign naval power was too
strong for Japan to resist. To Westerners at the time,
Japan's position seemed extremely precarious. Divided among
more than 260 autonomous feudal regimes, and united only
under Shogun whose authority and power were fast disintegra-
ting, Japan seemed ill prepared to respond to the challenge
of the more modernized Western nations; its pre- industrial
economy was no match for European machine production and its
small islands were pathetically exposed to Western sea power.
The determining factor, however, lay in the emergence of a
small group of nationalistic, low level samurai, who put
aside their ideological differences in their drive to raise
Japan to a level of equality with the West. To achieve
their objective, these samurai ousted the Tokugawa Shogun,
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re-established the Emperor as the source of all authority
and instituted their own version of "ruling from the
shadows .
"
B. MEIJI 1868 - RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION
The Meiji s:amurai leadership began their rule in 1868
with a markedly different outlook toward government than
their immediate predecessors. Although reared under the
tenets of Confucian philosophy they were nonetheless able
to overcome the political limitations of that philosophy
so as to be better able to meet the challenges of an en-
croaching West. These samurai began their rule with a
definite idea of where they were and what they wanted to do
In the words of Dankwart Rustow, they started with a "frank
assessment of its (Japan's.) particular- liabilities and
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assets." Japan was to be modernized and strengthened
through the use of Western knowledge, because the only
defense against the West lay in the creation in modern
form of the ancient Chinese ideal of a "rich country and
strong military," a form which they felt could only be
5 8
achieved by the absorption of Western technology.
The success that followed the Meiji Restoration of 1868
can best be illustrated by a few statistics calculated from
the publication "Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese
Economy" as contained in Tsurumi's monograph "Japanese
Business" and from Japanese Federation of Economic
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Organization ( Keidanren ) statistics on the Japanese econo-
my for 1980. During the period from 1868 to 1977, the
population of Japan increased from 34 million to 114.9
million people. During this same period, the life expec-
tancy of the Japanese grew from 42 years to 72.7 years for
men and from 44 years to 77.9 years for women. The culti-
vated area in Japan however, was increased by only 20%,
and the total food harvest of Japanese agriculture was
merely doubled. The Gross National Product (GNP) in real
terms on the other hand increased approximately 50-fold
from 1868-1964. During the same period, the contribution
of the manufacturing and construction industries to the GNP
increased from a meager 8.4% to 39% of the GNP.
In parallel with these trends, the employment structure
also changed. In the 1870s 83% of a work force estimated
at 19 million was engaged in agriculture and forestry. In
1964, of the estimated 47 million gainfully employed, only
27% was engaged in agricultural activites and in 1977 only
11.9% were so engaged. All these statistics indicate that
the manufacturing industries and the modern service indus-
tries that have been added to the Japanese economic
structure since 1868 have absorbed the bulk of the increased
population and have enabled Japan to provide its people
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with a higher level of material well-being. (Appendix C





Japan's industrialization since 1868 has been made
possible to a great extent by the accelerated accumulation
of manufacturing technologies. Piecemeal but continual
additions of new industries helped Japan sustain the tempo
of industrialization during the decades following the fall
of the Tokugawa. As noted earlier, these modernization
efforts were aided by governmental initiative, that is, the
government after 1868 took the lead in transplanting modern
manufacturing industries deemed essential to Japanese
growth and then provided tax benefits and other material
incentives such as tariff protection and import quota
arrangements to any enterprising Japanese who was willing to
take over and develop the infant industries.
1 . Foundations of Japan's Defense Industries
The foundations of Japan's defense industries were
begun during this period of great cultural upheaval and
social change. Mitsubishi, Kawasaki and Sumitomo were some
of the companies that were founded after the Meiji
Restoration by former samurai warriors - imaginative, aggres
sive entrepeneurs who took advantage of the "hothouse"
capitalism policies of the Meiji government to rapidly ex-
pand and enlarge their holdings and subsidiary companies
until they combined to form the huge, family structured
conglomerates that played important roles in Japan's later
historical experiences. The Mitsui combine actually pre-
dated the Meiji Restoration and was already an important
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banking and merchandizing firm when the coup was
effected.
Following the fall of the Tokugawa, the House of
Mitsui (owners of Ishikawaj ima-Harima Industries, a major
defense contractor) provided valuable expertise and re-
sources toward the building of the new Japan. It responded
to the calls of the Meiji government and furnished desper-
ately needed funds for its operations. As the government's
fiscal agent, it received deposits, disbursed funds, handled
trade and even issued its own paper currency, since its
credit was then better than the government's. It was no
accident therefore, that Mitsui was regarded as the de-facto
Ministry of Finance of the Meiji governement until the
establishment of the Bank of Japan in 1882.
The defense industries in particular also predated
the Meiji movement in that they began in the period follow-
ing the Opium Wars in China as an attempt to create the
necessary defenses to cope with the perceived dangers
emanating from the Western powers then growing more and
more assertive in the Northeast Asian region. The news of
the war and its aftermath forced the Tokugawa government
and the feudal rulers of the local Provinces to embark on
crash programs to found manufacturing operations immedi-
ately related to national defense, notably the building of
warships and the production of firearms and ammunition.
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The formidable problem facing the Daimyo was to
expedite the absorption of the has-ic scientific knowledge
underlying the manufacturing technologies of firearm and
ammunition. The initial requirement was to obtain indi-
viduals who were knowledgable in the engineering sciences
relevant to the manufacture of these defense items. It
was desired that they would, in turn, organize indigenous
craft skills for new manufacturing operations. The immedi-
ate need for manufacturing firearms for national defense was
so overwhelming that engineers and policy makers alike
relied on technical information contained in standard hand-
books of Dutch origin instead of trying to build up their




In 1846 and 1850 the Tokugawa government sent a
coastal defense order to the local Domains commanding them
to construct forts at key coastal points. This immediately
increased the demand for cannon and resulted in a signifi-
cant rise in the price of bronze which soon put the cost of
producing the needed cannon well beyond the financial means
of the makers of bronze cannon. The shortage of bronze and
the urgent need for cannon led warrior-engineers to seek a
substitute for bronze. Four samurai engineers of the Saga
Domain thereupon set out to study the Dutch technical works
on the construction of iron cannon. From 1847 to 1850
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these engineers translated the Dutch texts and experimen-
ted with the making of pig iron and casting and the use of
a reverberatory furnace.
Using locally obtained raw materials such as white
iron pyrite, charcoal, clay for firebricks, and sand for
casting molds they set about to produce their own Japanese
style iron cannon. After 16 failures during two years of
trial runs, the Saga Domain was able to produce iron can-
non successfully. By 1853 Saga had accumulated sufficient
engineering experience to meet the Tokugawa government's
purchase order for 200 cannons per year.
Following its success with iron cannon, the Saga
armaments industries branched out into steamship construc-
tion, percussion rifles and improved versions of the flint
lock musket. At the same time, Saga's military training
was revised to make better use of weapons made in Japan.
Saga's military superiority by 1368 was so distinctive
that it was invited into the military alliance against the
Tokugawa government in 1867 as one of the four major
Domains of the Alliance, the others being Choshu, Satsuma
and Tosa.
Armaments and militarily important industries were
in fact, the number one preoccupation of the reformers in
the post restoration period after 1868. Primary emphasis
was placed on the development of such heavy industries as
munitions and shipbuilding and numerous coal, sulphur and
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metal mines were opened and operated by governmental ini-
tiative to support these infant industries. Transportation
and communications networks were also expanded during this
period with an eye toward their military value. All of
the industry building and modernization policies pursued by
the Meiji government required vast amounts of currency to
pay for the imported technologies and it was during this
period that the previously discussed links between the
government and business communities in Japan were originally
forged. It is no exaggeration to say that without the ex-
tensive support and financial backing of such commerical
houses as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, there would have been no
industrial revolution as experience by the Japanese in the
years between 1868 and 1914.
Japan's military might proceeded as its military
industrial complex grew in furtherance of the objectives of
the samurai bureaucrats of the Meiji regime for a strong
national state able to defend and assert itself in the arena
of world politics. The long term strategy for national
modernization devised by this leadership group was followed
meticulously, patiently waiting for the right strategic
moment, biding time, bowing when necessary to superior
force, but always moving forward toward strength and
equality with the West.
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The moment for emergence as a major regional power
came in 1894 when the opportunity to expand the Empire into
the then raw material rich Korean Peninsula presented
itself. Politically the 1894-1895 war with China reinforced
the power and prestige of the ruling oligarchy for another
generation, winning unified support for Japan's aggressive
entry into the arena of Far East imperialism.
Economically, it exerted a stimulus no less immedi-
ate and far reaching in its consequences. Arms expenditures
accelerated the upswing in prices already underway. New
banks and small industrial and trading concerns mushroomed.
Military requirements doubled the merchant marine in two
years and led to an acceleration of the growth of the
Japanese shipbuilding industry to the extent that Japan was
able to almost halve its dependence on foreign carriers for
its export trade. Finally, a boom developed in numerous
war supply producing industries.
Despite the Triple Intervention by Russia, Germany
and France to limit Japan's gains from its victory over the
Chinese it was nonetheless able to secure a hold on Korea,
an indemnity from China of L38.4 million and an end to
Japan's "unequal treaties" with the Western powers, thereby
freeing Japan from all foreign interference in its internal
affairs. From this point on Japan energetically pursued
imperialist policies in the Far East designed to expand the
Empire, secure important sources of raw materials for its
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steadily growing industrial sector and provide a strategic
buffer area around the home islands for protection against
the Western powers.
Japan's defense industrial capabilities grew apace
with these imperialist policies and subsequently enabled
Japan to precipitate a war with Russia over the right to
dominate and exploit the Korean Peninsula. Japan's easy
victory over Czarist forces cemented its hold on Korea but
more importantly, it gave Japan rights to all Czarist eco-
nomic privileges in South Manchuria.
The expansion of the Japanese Empire at this point
was not without its problems however, as a glance at the
government's finances for the period will show. Because of
the strain imposed by heavy expenditures for war and arma-
ment expenditures of the national government tripled from
1893 to 1903. They reached 289 million Yen in 1903 alone -
no small sum for the time. Again, they more than doubled in
the course of the Russo-Japanese War. With the Army and
Navy now expanded, and with new commitments in Korea, they
remained from 1909 to 1913 just under 600 million Yen per
year. To pay for this large scale increase taxes were
raised and government monopolies created over high demand
commodities such as sugar and tobacco. However, this was
not enough and extensive borrowing was required in order
to finance their imperialist actions. The result of this
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financial burden was an increasing national debt, balance
of payments deficits and a rapidly spiraling inflationary
cycle.
Just as Japan seemed near the end of its financial
rope, the whole situation changed. War had broken out in
Europe. By 1915 orders began to pour in for Japanese goods,
for its shipping and for other vital services needed to
prosecute the v/ar. Almost overnight the country began to
reap huge profits in its international accounts resulting
in a boom for its trade and industry which brought unprece-
f\ 7
dented financial prosperity.
The advent of the First World War thus saw the com-
pletion of Japan's metamorphosis from a backward feudal
state to a level of relative equality with the foreign
powers active in the Northeast Asian region. The goals of
the Meiji samurai were being achieved faster than had
originally been imagined due to a combination of the innate
Japanese propensity to work together for the good of the
nation and their ability to rapidly assimilate Western
technological advances, modifying as necessary to meet
Japanese requirements. By taking advantage of external
political opportunities, the Japanese leadership had shown
itself capable of successfully translating their internal
power potential into an international power position. The
Japanese entered the 20th Century confident of their
abilities, proud of their achievements and eager to assume
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a leadership role commensurate with their newly gained
power and prestige in the region.
C. THE INTERWAR PERIOD 1914-1937
Japan's high hopes for its acceptance as an equal
partner with the Western community of nations was soon
destroyed however, in the aftermath of World War I. A
combination of factors caused by the upheaval of the war
worked against the Japanese in their national drive for
equality. The first factor which influenced Japan was the
recessionary trend that soon followed the armistice.
Second was the rise of racial discrimination particularly
on the part of the United States toward Japanese immigra-
tion and business. The third factor was the growth of
protectionist measures in international trade which were
directed against Japanese goods; and finally, there was the
fact that political change had taken place only on the sur-
face of the Japanese population. Liberal democracy in the
1920s was poorly understood by the people themselves and
never established roots. The domestic pressures caused by
the other three factors resulted in the rebirth of
Japanese militarism and a reemergence of imperialist
policies in the 1930s.
1. Economic Effects of World War I
World War I provided the second surge in the growth
of Japan's industrial revolution, particularly in regard to
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its strategic industries. Because Japan was at war only as
a result of its alliance with Great Britain, Japan limited
its actual fighting to the Asian mainland while at the same
time taking advantage of the economic benefits that arose
out of the conflict. The Allies began placing large orders
for Japanese munitions and other war related materials thus
spurring the growth and expansion of the defense industries.
Neutral countries, especially those of the Far East, turned
to Japan for goods formerly supplied by the industrial
nations now involved in the European War. Japan's shipping
industry alone had a growth in net income from 41.2 million
Yen in 1914 to 381.4 million Yen in 1919. 69 By almost any
standard, the war years witnessed a significant advance in
Japan's productive capacity, foreign trade position and
technical maturity.
The economic boom created by the war lasted for
only a year after the armistice at which time the wartime
spiraling inflation rate reversed itself into a period of
deflation and readjustment. Because of the vast foreign
exchange generated during the war years, Japan was able to
recover rather quickly but recovery brought with it the
problem of finding peacetime economic opportunity for its
rapidly growing population. Added to this market problem
was the financial instability which then plagued the world
economic community and which resulted in the collapse of
the gold standard and the depression years of the late 1920s
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and early 1930s. Japan in the 1920s thus found itself
reaping some of the disadvantages of industrialism -
dependence upon an unstable world economy, growing class
conflicts and social strains and all the difficulties that
go with the maintaining growth and equilibrium in an
industrial economy. Japan was faced with a choice between
two options: it could continue to expand its empire through
military conquest, as had been done so successfully in the
years immediately before the war or it could adopt the
policies of political and economic interdependence and
interantionalism that were then coming into vogue in an
effort to counter the economic effects of the war's after-
math. Japan obviously needed foreign markets to pay for
its huge imports of raw materials required to support its
expanding; economy and therefore it had to choose between
one or the other options in that any combination of the two
would not be an acceptable policy vis-a-vis Japan's
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national interest.
The problem was of particular urgency in China
where Japan had recently become the dominant external power
best able to take advantage of China's weakness. The
Japanese had growing population problems which required a
safety valve release area to defuse potential internal
problems which could result from an inability to provide
sufficient amounts of cheap food and job opportunities.
Also, North China or Manchuria held a huge store of vital
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raw materials for the Japanese industrial machine. The
situation in China however, was changing. The Chinese
people with a newly awakened sense of nationalism, were
beginning to boycott foreign merchants whose governments
were considered to be pursuing an aggressive policy against
their country. The result of this situation meant that
military intervention in China cost the double price of
lost markets and increased military expenditures.
Japan's post WW I leadership chose to follow the
road of peaceful trade rather than imperialist expansion.
The politicians and businessmen, supported by the general
public, opted for this course, and the bureaucrats and
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military were induced, with misgivings, to go along.
As a result of this decision the Japanese military system
was cut back and further expansion of war related indus-
tries was deemphasized as the government shifted its
attention toward capitalizing on its comparative advantages
in the civilian industrial sector. This policy preference
served Japan well in the first half of the post WW I decade
however, as the worldwide economic strains worsened so did
Japan's ability to compete on an equal footing with the
West.
2. Racial Discrimination
The first sign of international discord was the
rise of racist legislation in the United States directed
towards the Japanese. The seeds of this problem were first
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sown at the Versailles Peace Conference when the
Australian delegate successfully thwarted the adoption of
a Japanese proposal declaration regarding the principals of
racial equality. The Japanese were particularly insulted
by this action and it was not forgotten by the ardent
nationalists then emerging in Japanese society. Many of
these individuals saw collusion on the part of the United
States over this issue and rumors of a Japan-American war
were heard throughout Tokyo. Resentment against the United
States during this period stemmed from a number of reasons:
American opposition to the twenty-one demands against China
and Japan's continued presence in Shantung; American immi-
gration policy designed to eliminate and/or restrict any
further entry of Japanese nationals into the country in-
cluding the alleged role in "defeating" Japan's efforts to
have a "racial equality" clause written into the Covenant
of the League of Nations. Finally, there was resentment
over the American opposition against Japan's military occu-
71pation of portions of Siberia and northern Sakhalin.
3 . Economic Protectionism
By 1925 Japan's population had reached 60 million
and was growing at the rate of 1 million per year.
Becuase of this, it was becoming increasingly dependent on
imported food and raw materials and foreign markets to pay
for these imports. As previously noted, emigration offered
no solution to the population problem, because the
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relatively empty lands, such as the United States, Canada
and Australia, barred Japanese immigrants. Most importantly
though, because of the worsening economic situation, pro-
tectionist measures were being erected by the West against
the cheap industrial exports of Japan thereby barring
Japanese trade with the Asian and African Empires of the
72
European powers.
As a result of these protectionist measures, Japan
was forced to look to its own colonies for survival. The
Empire had to be developed so as to supply the home islands
with growing amounts of food and raw materials. In addition,
the rise of these barriers to trade aroused further fear
and resentment among the Japanese and provided further
incidences for the rising nationalist movement to utilize
in their drive toward a goal of a self-sufficient empire.
Yet, by 1936, Japan depended upon overseas sources, foreign
or colonial, for 20% of its net supply of rice and beans,
35% of its fats and oils, 60 to 80% of its iron and steel,
7 890% fertilizer and 100% of its cotton, wool and rubber.
4. Rebirth of Militarism
The internal pressures caused by these external
factors resulted in an agitation of Japanese society which
culminated in a reversal of the trend toward Liberal
democracy that had begun in the early twenties. The
authoritarian heritage of the Japanese with its emphasis




combined with the emergence of ultra-nationalist factions
within the Japanese military, supported by academic geo-
politicians who were students of German "Geopolitik" to
cause a shift in the political tide within the country.
Pro-military supporters began to take over control of the
Diet, military expenditures were raised thereby resulting
in a renewed emphasis on the defense related industrial
sector of the nation. Military units began to take actions
on their own to further the Japanese Empire in Manchuria.
Such actions only worsened Japan's relations with the West
and hastened the onset of World War II.
The renewal of hostilities in China in 1937 re-
quired fresh military outlays on a greatly expanded scale.
This caused government financial deficits to grow once
again. (605 million Yen in 1937, 1298 million Yen in 1939
and 2406 million Yen in 1940). By 1940, however, Japanese
resources were near full employment. Drastic controls were
placed on the foreign exchange market in order to restrict
normal imports and divert exchange resources progressively
to steel, oil, and other strategic materials. The continued
expansion of war industries both within Japan and in North
China, now Manchukuo , led to a spreading network of con-
trols over domestic production and investment to channel
materials and labor to the defense-related industries,
resulting in a progressive dislocation of the entire struc-
ture of Japanese industry and trade.
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The interwar years thus saw Japan attempt peace-
fully to integrate itself into the World economic community.
Its growing economic strength, however, generated fears
within the industrialized West of their ability to compete
with Japan in this vital international area. Because of
these fears protectionist sentiments arose which subse-
quently led to the establishment of barriers to trade
designed specifically to limit the impact of Japanese goods
on the world marketplace. These protectionist measures
added to the already severe internal pressures within Japan
caused by its growing urban population. Japan had a vital
need to export goods to pay for needed raw material imports
and any action to inhibit this trade would only lead to
worsening economic conditions at home.
In short order the Japanese government abandoned
the pursuit of protecting its economic well-being through
diplomacy. Rising nationalist forces, now firmly in con-
trol of the Diet, sought instead to establish an empire
which would ensure for Japan self-sufficiency of raw
materials and markets, plus provide autonomy from the
Western powers. Again, the threat from without caused
reactions from within the Japanese government to cope with
and meet the perceived threat to Japan's independence and
equality and its recently won prosperity. The rising tide
of Japanese nationalism, which reached fanatical proportions
when grounded in the worship of the Emp-eror as the "son of
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Heaven," combined with the complex interrelationship
between a powerful business community and an increasingly
militant government to lead Japan to invade Manchuria in
1931; to war with China in 1937; to the announcement of the
Greater East Asia Co. Prosperity Sphere in 1941 which
ultimately led to war with the United States.
D. THE POSTWAR REVIVAL
Within four short years Japan was in ruins with an
occupying Army and dim prospects for the future. However,
another combination of benevolent rule, Japanese ingenuity,
skill and determination revived the Japanese economy and
set it on yet another road towards economic health.
Japanese economic activity at the end of World War II had
been brought to a virtual standstill as a result of the
nearly complete destruction of production resources by
Allied action. The complete suspension of foreign trade
and other dislocations caused by the war itself resulted in
rampant inflation and a serious food shortage. Direct con-
trols of the economy were once again necessary, including
such measures as price controls, allocation of scarce
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materials and the rationing of food and other necessities.
To many domestic and foreign observers at the time, the
future economic recovery of Japan was perceived as being
extremely tenuous and one which would require a long re-
habilitation period before pre-war prosperity levels could
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be regained. However, a number of internal and external
factors worked favorably to Japan's economic advantage,
allowing it to achieve its pre-war (1934-36 average) per
capita real national income as early as 1953, and rapid
economic growth has continued thereafter, so that the
average annual growth rate of 9.61 for the 1950' s and 11%
for the 1960's was more than double the pre-war rate of
7 f\
4.6%. Table 1 illustrates the wide disparity in growth
rate which Japan registered over that 20 year span in
comparison to those of the other industrialized nations:
Table 1. Rate of Growth in Selected Countries
at constant prices
Country 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70
Japan 9.1 10.1 10.0 12.1
France 4.5 4.2 5.9 5.8
W. Germany 9.0 6.0 4.9 4.8
U.K. 2.6 2.4 3.3 2.4
U.S.A. 4.3 2.3 4.9 3.3
Since the 1973 oil crisis however, Japan's growth rate
has declined markedly, whereas those of the other industri-
alized states have remained more or less steady. Table 2
provides a breakdown of this trend in terms of Gross
Domestic Product.
Internally, the most important elements in Japan's post
war economic resurgence can be directly attributed to the
policies of the Allied occupational forces under MacArthur.
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78Table 2. Rate of Growth in Selected Countries
at constant prices
Country 1969-73 1976 1977 1978
Japan 9.0 6.0 5.4 5.6
France 5.6 4.6 3.1 3.8
W. Germany 4.2 5.6 2.8 3.5
U.K. 3.5 3.6 1.2 3.5
U.S.A. 3.6 5.5 4.8 4.4
Although the official policy of SCAP (Supreme Commander
Allied Powers) emphasized measures to prevent Japan from
regaining military strength, the Allied staff did not limit
themselves to this particular area of post war reconstruc-
tion. In addition to limiting Japan's warmaking potential
the staff also followed an economic democratization policy
which was aimed at reforming the social and economic
structure of Japan. During the occupation period, the
United States repeatedly sent teams of experts to Japan to
offer advice on the modernization of Japanese industries.
Just as in 1868, the use of foreign expertise was once
again utilized to bring Japan into the world community.
Extensive domestic reforms carried out under the auspices
of the MacArthur staff dismantled the corporate structure
of the zaibatsu conglomerates thereby infusing new blood
into the Japanese society in general and the economy in




The dismantling of the pre-war zaibatsu had a stimu-
lating impact on industry by fostering free competition
within the business community. The purge of the top
management levels allowed the ascendancy of younger, more
vigorous managerial talents within the newly re-organized
companies thereby stimulating renewed growth and expanded
investments. Thus, defeat in war and the sweeping reforms
which followed, cleared the ground for starting competition
from scratch and re-invigorated the entire business
community.
However, these were only the direct results of the
Occupation itself. In and of themselves they were not
sufficient to provide the impetus to expand in the same
vein as the Meiji forefathers had after the Meiji
Restoration. What actually turned the tide were those
certain, innate characteristics of the Japanese that have
set them apart from the rest of Asian society, that is,
their ability to rebound from defeat to press on with
needed reforms to raise Japan once again to a level of
equality with the Westerner, undistracted by regrets for
past ambitions and actions; their propensity for hard work;
the Meiji legacy of a virtual 99% literacy rate; the glut
of a large, trained labor force and the fact that they had
been freed from the necessity of maintaining an economy
draining military budget by virtue of Article 9 to the
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post-war Japanese "Peace" Constitution which provides in
part that:
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceeding
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other
war making potential will never be maintained. The
right of belligerancy of the state will not be
recognized. "?9
These factors have combined with an already proven ability
to successfully import foreign technology to provide Japan
with all the basic elements needed to restart their
stalled economic system.
1 . Economic Reconstruction Policies
Just as their Meiji forefathers, the postwar
government concentrated on building the economic basis of
a "strong country," only this time unencumbered by the
"strong military" side of the equation. An Economic
Stabilization Board was created in 1946 to formulate a
general framework of policies for economic rehabilitation.
This group worked out a set of policies, named the Priority
Production Program, which stressed the concentration of
efforts on increasing coal production in order to generate
sufficient capital to facilitate the resumption of produc-
tion of other basic goods. Postwar inflation was brought
under control through the use of the "Dodge Plan" formu-
lated by a Detroit banker, Joseph Dodge, which reduced
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the multiple exchange rate system then in use to a single
8
exchange rate - 360 Yen to the Dollar.
With inflation under control the Japanese govern-
ment set about to close the technology gap that had exis-
ted both prior to and during the war years. As contacts
with foreign countries were restored, the import of "know-
how" from highly developed countries began anew. The
postwar investment boom was based mainly on this importa-
tion of technology and its application in the actual
production process. In importing new technologies,
selections were once again made to take best advantage of
local conditions and actual market forces with an eye to-
wards the most profitable factor combination.
The Japanese leadership in the postwar period
moved away from the policies of confrontation and power
politics in their search for equality and world power
status, policies which had led to a devastating war in
which the world's first atomic bombs were detonated over
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Instead,
it turned toward the more peaceful and less dangerous compe
tition in the market places of the world. Japan's techno-
logical imports in the late 1940' s and early 1950 ' s
followed the pattern set by the Meiji in that each new
technology imported was improved upon through Japanese
ingenuity to the extent that greater productivity was
achieved in numerous industries than had originally been
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predicted and which resulted in an increasing comparative
advantage accruing to Japan in manufacturing productivity.
The major difference between the imports of the
Meij i of 1868 and the Japan of the 1950s was that whereas
the Meiji forefathers stressed the accumulation first of
militarily important technologies, the postwar leadership
concentrated strictly on importing economically compete-
tive technologies . During the initial period of rapid
growth, civilian production accounted for the lion's share
of domestic demand, war-related goods played an insignifi-
8
1
cant role. By scrupulous use of the latest technology
from abroad, and by a continuing research and development
program in those areas considered essential to the growth
of the Japanese economy, labor productivity rose which, in
turn, further increased Japan's comparative advantage in
the important labor intensive industries in the world
marketplace
.
In addition to these direct market related changes,
there were more intangible factors inherent to the Japanese
people themselves, which also contributed to Japan's
meteoric reconstruction process. The most important of
these innate qualities was the attitude of the people them-
selves. As alluded to earlier, the Japanese people were
devastated but not destroyed psychologically as a result
of their defeat in 1945. Their nationalism was as strong
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as ever, as was their sense of uniqueness and desire to
regain their place in the world order of nations.
After the disillusionment with the policy of mili-
taristic expansionism, and the misery and devastation which
the people experienced due to the bankruptcy of this
earlier policy, the Japanese people in general tended to
assume an internationalist "economy first" attitude. The
energies of the people were now directed towards economic
rehabilitation and development. High rates of labor
productivity combined with the traditional low rate of
Japanese domestic consumption to create favorable con-
ditions for high rates of savings which, in turn, provided
the necessary capital for further industrial expansion.
After refurbishing the basic industries such as coal, iron,
steel, fertilizer, power and food, the government branched
our, like the Meiji, to encourage the establishment of new
industries, including petrochemicals, the modernization of
older, more basic industries and the promotion of policies
designed to increase exports while providing import pro-
tection to older agricultural and the newer "infant"
industries. Monetary and banking practices were heavily
oriented toward production, as exemplified by the fact that
bank loans were available primarily to manufacturers and
traders while credit to consumers was severely restricted.
The Japanese version of the free enterprise system
in Japan is a modern day reflection of the Japan of the
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late 19th Century, that is, the system is characterized by
a close, cooperative and mutually supportive relationship
between government and business. Economic growth has been
nurtured by such cooperation and in part has been directed
by informal administrative advice from various governmental
Ministries, such as the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) , the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, based on their studies of world economic
trends and appraisals of Japan's domestic and economic
needs
.
1 . Raw Materials Dependency
Encouraging the rapid growth rate of the Japanese
economy up until the late 1960s was a worldwide surplus
of raw materials (including oil) , with the international free
trade system established by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
8 3
assuring their availability at reasonable rates. This
surplus of raw materials in the postwar era was in direct
contrast to the situation tht existed prior to the outbreak
of World War II. Where the United States earlier had
worked to limit or prevent Japan's access to vital raw
material stocks it now provided these raw materials either
freely or at greatly reduced cost in order to rebuild
Japan's ravaged economy.
Since Japan's acquisition of independence from
Occupation rule it has continued to stress the importance
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of the free access to vital stocks of raw materials to the
continued health of its economy. As Yamamoto Mitsuro
observed, with Japan defining its national interest in
terms of continued growth, its foreign policy has been
couched in the logic of economics with little regard for
8 4
the international implications of such policies. This
type of perspective has manifested itself in a resource
policy based solely on "securing abundant supplies of
8 5
cheap natural resources." In short, Japan has acted more
like an international trading company than a nation state
since 1952 which has resulted in the rather deprecatory
title of "Japan Inc." being given to describing the actions
of Japan on the world scene. Yet, the results of these
policies are immense.
By remaining in the shadow of the United States in
most foreign affairs and security matters, and concentrating
on rebuilding domestically and expanding its international
trade through the exploitation of the principles of com-
parative advantage, Japan's GNP has risen from its Y8.0
trillion level in 1955 to Y210 trillion in 1978. Japan's
portion of world GNP amounted to $14.9 billion in 1960, or
3.2% of the total world GNP. By 1970, Japan's percentage
8 7
of world GNP had doubled to 6.21. Storm clouds however,
are gathering once again over the future of Japan and they
are engendering a debate both within and without Japan as
to the future of its economic health. The postwar
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conglomerates have been struck with ever increasing energy-
costs and a concern about the future availability of the
raw materials necessary to keep the economy functioning.
3 . Reemergence of Japan's Arms Industries
The first Nixon "shock" of 1971 ended the Bretton
Woods system of International Free Trade based on fixed
exchange rates, while the oil crisis of 1973 demonstrated
that buying power alone was insufficient to insure the
availability of natural resources. As happened once
before in 1929, Japan's vulnerability due to its virtual
total dependence on foreign raw materials (see Appendix D)
was once again highlighted. Since 1973 Japan has been
forced to realize that its policy of "Seikei bunri," or the
separation of economic and foreign policies, will become
progressively more difficult to operationalize in view of
the trend toward "cartelization" of vital primary resources.
Concern has arisen among the government and
business leaders about the total dependence upon their
chief ally the United States and its ability by itself to
protect what they deem the essential lines of communication
that form Japan's economic lifeline. It is this debate that
has shed increasing light on the current state of Japan's
armaments industry, a sector of the economy which has
quietly developed in classic Japanese imitative style since
the reemergence of Japan's military system following the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Defense related issues
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are no longer a taboo subject in Diet debates. In
January 1978, the then Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo became
the first postwar Premier to give defense a separate cate-
gory in a speech marking the opening of a session of the
Diet. This new interest in the subject of armaments and
defense comes at a time when the consensus among the
Japanese people concerning such matters as defense expen-
ditures, the advisability of weapons exports and the very
constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces themselves,
has yet to be clearly determined.
Although Japan was denied by constitutional dictate,
a resort to force as a means of policy later broader in-
terpretations of Article 9 have been made allowing the
development of a purely "defensive" force whose objective
"is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and, once
invaded, to repel such aggression thereby preserving the
independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic
88principles." Since General MacArthur realized the need
for an indigenous security force when US Occupation troops
were withdrawn, the United States has been the prime
supplier of Japan's defense needs. In 1950, Japan's
defense budget for the First Defense Buildup Plan totalled
$364 million or 19.8% of the national budget. For a number
of years thereafter defense expenditures expanded and con-
tracted rather unpredictably but by 1955 the figure was
more or less the same as five years previous, that is,
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$375 million. Since that date however, Japan's defense
expenditures have increased quietly but steadily year after
year.
Defense related expenditures have decreased only in
relation to the GNP and the national budget. Defense out-
lays accounted for 1.781 of the GNP in 1955, 1.231 in 1960
and by 1967 this percentage had fallen to below the 1%
level where it has been scrupulously maintained as a matter
of governmental policy ever since. (See Appendix E) This
policy however, has been the subject of increasing criti-
cism both within and without Japan since Richard Nixon's
enunciation of the "Guam Doctrine" in 1969. The ratio to
the national budget has followed the same pattern. In 1955
defense received 13.61%, in 1960 9.99%, 8.24% in 1965,
7.16% in 1970, 5.54% in 1977.
The issues of arms, armaments, arms industries and
defense have been the center of some of the most heated
postwar Japanese controversies. As one of the world's most
industrialized nations, Japan has the capability of manu-
facturing nearly all of its military equipment. However,
Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits the possession and
sale of war making material and, to a certain extent, this
has precluded the Japanese from developing this aspect of
their industrial economy. Denied markets for the military
hardware they could produce, the costs the Japanese would
incur in developing weapons for their own self defense
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requirements have become prohibitively expensive. They have
however, diligently maintained state of the art experience
through the time tested method of importation and imitation
of advanced weapons technologies, often time adapting them
to suit their particular needs. Consequently, the
Japanese tend to produce, under license, equipment developed
by other nations, notably the United States.
The major weapons systems currently being produced
under license by Japan are the following:
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd .: F-86F, F-104J
and F-4EJ jet fighters; S-55, HHS-2(S-61) and S-62
helicopters; Allison 250, Pratt and Whitney JT8D
engines
.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd .: T-33, P2V-7 air-
craft; Bell 47, Boeing Vertol KV-107 and Hughes
500 helicopters; T-53 engines.
Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd .: T-34A, L-19 aircraft;
Bell 204B helicopters.
Ishikawaj ima-Harima Heavy Industries, Ltd . : Adour
(TF40), J79, CT58 and T64 engines.
In addition to the above, multiple contracts have recently
been awarded for the co-production and licensed production
of the E-2C, P-3C and F-15 aircraft which the Japanese are
procuring in order to update and improve their air defense
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system.
In addition to the above systems produced under
license, the Japanese have branched out into development
and production of various forms of armaments regardless of
the costs incurred, as an effort to maintain their
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relative independence from the West and to maintain their
level of equality and, if possible, their competitiveness
with Western arms manufacturers. Currently Japanese
industry produces aircraft, ships, engines, small arms,
missiles, tanks and a variety of electrical and electronic
equipment indigenously. Major equipment that has been
developed by the Japanese include the following:
T-l trainer (jet), PS-1 ASW amphibian, C-l trans-
port, G-2 trainer, F-l close support jet fighter,
Type 64 antitank missiles, Type 69 air-to-air
missile, Type 64 7.62mm rifles, Type 68 model 30
rockets, 127mm air-to-air rocket, Type 75 155mm
self propelled gun, Type 75 self-propelled, multi
barrelled rocket launcher, Type 73 armored vehicle,
Type 74 tank and three dimensional radars.
Research and development is also underway for the following
projects: a short range ground to ground missile, a ground
to air missile, air to ship missiles, a high speed homing
90torpedo, a field battle artillery fire instruction device,
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a follow on to the C-l transport plane, a new surface to
92
surface missile, " and most recently, extensive effort has
been directed toward developing laser technology with
weapons systems applications and a follow-on to T-74 Main
Battle Tank to include a gun system which will be com-
patible to standard NATO tank armament, (a fact which may
indicate a future export oriented objective)
Overall however, Japan enjoys the distinction of




As Japan exports almost no ordnance, the procure-
ment figures of the Defense Agency are just about equal to
the total production of Japan's defense related industries,
an amount equal to about .31 of Japan's industrial output.
While this figure appears to be low, it should be kept in
mind that virtually every major industry in Japan is
currently engaged in some form of weapons production work
for the Japanese Self Defense Forces. The top ten Japanese
defense manufacturers for 1978 were as follows:











Many people believe that Japan will soon breech the
current psychological 1% of the GNP barrier in defense
spending and that once this barrier is broken Japan will
proceed rapidly to a 2% level of defense spending. There
is also a widespread belief that Japan can no longer shirk
the responsibilities which her status as an economic super-
power has laid upon it and that Japan will develop a mili-
tary capability commensurate with its economic status. In
fact, as shown in Chapter III, many of the above industries,













are pushing quietly but firmly not only for an increase in
domestic defense spending, but also for a relaxation of the
1967 ban on exports. Several of these industries such as
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsui Engineering and Ship-
building and Kawasaki Heavy Industries have been particu-
larly hard hit by the recent recession and have been in the
forefront in pressing for increased defense contracts and
a liberalized export policy.
From the foregoing it is evident that Japan's
policies vis-a-vis its defense postures and its military
industrial structure have been traditionally based on a
frank perception of the environment in which it must exist.
Traditionally Japan's activist period in the realm of
military related responses have been the result of feelings
of stress and fear for the survival of their nation in
combination with an ethnocentric view of their proper role
within the world community of nations. I have shown in
Chapters II and III that there is a change taking place
within Japan, subtle though it may be at present, with
regard to its basic defense policies in general and with
respect to its policy on arms exports in particular. It
appears to this writer that this shift denotes yet another
coping response on the part of the Japanese people to a
perception of a growing external threat. The following
Chapter will be an analysis of that external threat.
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V. THE 198 NORTHEAST ASIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY
The events of the decade of the seventies have combined
to cause a significant change in the strategic environment
in Northeast Asia. Since the end of the Pacific War in
1945, Japan has been able to rely on the security umbrella
of the United States and thereby focus its national ener-
gies on a single all consuming objective; the maximization
93
of economic growth.
There is little disagreement about the key elements that
cumulatively have generated Japan's postwar economic dyna-
mism. Foremost among the sociopolitical factors is the
singular degree of racial, cultural and linguistic homo-
geneity in Japanese society that has provided the founda-
tion for national unity. This homogeneity is largely the
product of Japan's geographic isolation which has meant an
historical absence of both large scale migration into the
Japanese islands and, until 1945, a successful foreign
invasion.
Japanese society, perhaps because of its homogeneity,
also appears to possess an extraordinary propensity for
94
what Herman Kahn has called "purposeful communal action."
Added to this characteristic of the Japanese is the old
samurai ethic of loyalty, which, when combined with the
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fact that the Japanese people are individually and collec-
tively, highly motivated, well educated, achievement and
work oriented, energetic and self disciplined, has enabled
the Japanese to push forward in the postwar period to
catch up with the West through the maximization of economic
growth.
The international events of the 1970' s, however, have
cast a new light on the economic well being of Japanese
society and have brought the question of strategic interests
to the fore in the minds of the Japanese leadership. The
1973 oil embargo dramatically demonstrated the tenuous
nature of Japan's industrial dependency on imported oil. In
addition, the burgeoning Soviet military presence throughout
East Asia, that followed on the heels of a lowered U.S.
profile in the Pacific, raised some doubts about Washington's
commitment to Tokyo under the Joint Security Treaty and has
consequently brought the question of the security for
Japan's essential sea lines of communication (SLOC) into
focus. Japan's economy is heavily dependent on external
resources and its population and industrial and administra-
tive centers are concentrated in a small geographic area.
The most likely potential military threat to Japan and its
life support system would therefore seem to be the cutting





Two other events have also occurred which have had a
significant impact on the Japanese leadership in awakening
them to the Northeast Asian strategic picture. These were
the two "shokku" perpetrated by the United States. The
first of these was the announcement in 1972 of the normali-
zation of relations between the United States and the
People's Republic of China by the Nixon Administration and
secondly, the announcement by the Carter Administration in
1976 of phased troop withdrawals from the Korean peninsula.
Both of these events took place without prior consultation
between the United States and Japan. As a result, the
Japanese leadership has begun to embark upon a more inde-
pendent foreign policy in tune with what the Japanese
perceive their national interests to be in the strategic
environment of the Northeast Asian area.
This new individualism in foreign policy has taken
place concurrently with a rebirth of nationalism on the
part of the Japanese people and both have combined to alter
the internal political climate in such a way that political
opinion and cooperation has been achieved on a number of
defense related questions which had previously been
extremely controversial. The following sections provide an
overview of the geostrategic milieu to which Japan must
adapt itself to and which will have the greatest impact on





A. THE KURILE ISLANDS DISPUTE
First of all is the Kurile Islands dispute between
Japan and the Soviet Union. In the sometimes turbulent
course of postwar Japanese-Soviet relations no issue has
been more central, none more difficult and few more persis-
tent than that of the Northern Territories. Over the past
decades both Japan and the Soviet Union laid conflicting
claims to various of the 36 islands, spanning some 1200
kilometers, which lie in a northeast arch between Japan's
96big island Hokaido, and the Soviet Kamchatka peninsula.
This dispute between the two governments today, concerns
the four southernmost islands, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai
and Shikotan.
The strategic importance of the islands from the Soviet
point of view cannot be understated. The Kuriles serve as
a gateway into the Pacific for the growing Soviet Far
Eastern Fleet, and secure a Soviet "lake" within the Sea of
Okhotsk which would afford the approximately 50 nuclear
powered and missile equipped Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines
97plenty of safe maneuvering room.
The problem itself can be traced back to the mid 18th
Century with the convergence of both Japan and Czarist
Russia on the Kuriles. The subsequent struggle over
ownership was seemingly settled by the Treaties of Shimoda
(1855) and St. Petersburg (1875). However, Soviet Russia,
not willing to accept the Japanese claims based on Czarist
98

settlements, gained by diplomacy and force what Japan
obviously would never yield in peacetime. Since 1905,
Japanese possession of the Kuriles arc had blocked Soviet
access to the Pacific and hindered Soviet exploitation of
lucrative fishing waters.
By accepting the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August 1945,
Japans' s leaders acquiesced to giving up all her annexations
made by conquest since 1895. However, it is doubtful that
Japan expected to lose the entire Kurile Islands since
their ownership had been established peacefully by the
Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875. What was unknown to them
at the time was that Roosevelt, at the Yalta Conference,
had acquiesced to the Soviet concession demands by Stalin
as the price for Russia's entry into the Pacific War.
Roosevelt was under the misapprehension that the four
northern islands were included in the Kuriles allotted to
Japan by Russia in the War of 1905. Therefore he considered
the Soviet demands to be reasonable. The Soviet Union
entered the war on 9 September 1945 and immediately seized
Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. During
the occupation period, the Soviet Union strengthened its
hold on the Kuriles by first repatriating the Japanese
inhabitants, replacing them with Soviet citizens and then
absorbing the islands into the U.S.S.R. by an amendment to
the Soviet Constitution in 1945. In a speech delivered on
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2 September 1945, Stalin spoke of the Kurile's new signifi-
cance to the Soviet Union:
"Henceforth, the Kurile Islands shall not serve as
a means to cut off the Soviet Union from the ocean or
as a base for a Japanese attack on our Far East, but
as a means to link the Soviet Union with the ocean
and as a defensive base against Japanese aggression. "98
However, rather than ending the frontier problem the Soviets
actually compounded it by sowing the seeds of protest in
Japan and sparking an irredentist movement in the Northern
prefecture of Hokkaido, the province with the closest
ethnological ties to the island in question and which has
subsequently spread to become a nationalistic force d'etre
nation-wide.
To further compound the problem, when Prime Minister
Yoshida signed the peace treaty in San Francisco in 1951,
he in effect renounced all rights and claims to the
Kuriles. Since that signing however, the Japanese have
persistently argued that Yoshida defined the Kuriles as
only those islands to the north of Etorofu. The four
islands south of and including Etorofu were still claimed
by the Japanese under the terms of the St. Petersburg
Treaty.
The debate has continued to cause friction between the
two nations and has recently intensified in scope. The
first incident was the June 1978 Soviet airborne and
amphibious assault landing exercises on Etorofu. These
exercises, coupled with increased harassment of Japanese
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fishermen, coincided with the negotiations between Japan
and the People's Republic of China and were seen at the
time as geopolitical muscle flexing and a heavy handed
attempt to influence the Japanese negotiating stance.
Tokyo was being told in not too subtle terms that China
99
was not the only Asian power on its doorstep.
Again, in September of 1979, the Soviet hold on these
disputed territories was further strengthened by the
revelation that the Soviets had begun to construct a
permanent presence on the island of Shikotan and all indi-
cations appear to suggest that the building activity is
related to the establishment of brigade level strength
within eyesight distance of the northernmost island of
Hokkaido.
A permanent presence on the Kuriles has put the
Japanese on notice that the disputed islands are firmly in
the Soviet domain and they serve, along with the increased
military build-up and naval activities in the straits and
waterways surrounding Japan, as a constant reminder of the
military strength of the Soviet Union and an important
factor to be considered when formulating Japanese foreign
policies
.
B. THE KOREAN PENINSULA
The second strategic factor of concern to the Japanese
is Korea, an area referred to by some as the "Flanders of
the Orient." Others have described Korea as the "Dagger
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102pointed at the heart of Japan." In any event, it is the
land bridge which provided Japan access to Manchuria and to
the Russian Maritime Provinces in the early 20th Century.
Conversely, Korea has been the point of embarkation both
for thrusts to Japan across the Korea or Tsushima Straits
and for advances into the Sea of Japan and thence into the
Pacific with simultaneous control of the Yellow Sea. More
recently, however, Korea is important strategically in that
it is the point where the three Superpowers, the United
States, the Soviet Union and China confront each other most
closely. It is therefore in Japan's national interest to
have a stable environment in the Northeast Asian area.
Overall, the following four points can be postulated
as an encapsulation of Japan's national interests as they
relate to the Korean Peninsula:
a. There must not be another outbreak of war in Korea.
b. Japan should not adopt a Korea policy which
invites the serious hostility of Beijing or
Moscow.
c. South Korea should be controlled by a non-hostile
government.
d. Japan should attempt to derive the maximum
possible economic and political benefits from
the Korean Peninsula as a whole. 103
These four interests should be properly viewed in hier-
archical terms. The first is of the utmost importance, the
second and third are of great consequence, while the fourth




In light of the present crisis situation in Korea it
can be seen that Korea remains Asia's most volatile flash-
point. However, it is believed that as long as the United
States remains dedicated to the deterrence of North Korean
revanchist tendencies and takes measures to prevent any
attempts by the North Koreans to capitalize on the political
upheavals resulting from the present succession crisis, then
no renewal of open warfare between the two sides will
result. This prediction however, in order to hold true,
will also require the continued refusal of the Soviets and
the Chinese Communists to support Kim II Sung ' s desire to
pursue a more activist, aggressive policy in attempting to
reunite the peninsula.
Japan, therefore, responsive as it must be to these
three Superpowers, has a vested interest in the maintenance
of peace and stability on the Korean mainland. Should
hostilities break out anew, it would undoubtedly present a
direct threat to its very existence. For this reason,
Japan has attempted to walk a tightrope in its relations
with each of its superpower neighbors, always eschewing
politices that would cause friction or any undue hostility
which could result in the increase of tension within the
area.
Should there be a flareup of such tension leading to
renewed conflict within the region, Japan would almost
certainly be drawn into the conflict and, in view of its
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present non-nuclear lightly armed defense forces, such an
event could prove catastrophic to Japan. Therefore, the
geopolitical reality of the situation calls for Japan to
"walk the fence" which separates all the nations with
interests in the Korean Peninsula.
This policy appears to have been successful to date in
that Japan has steadily increased her trade with both
Koreas, thereby maintaining a lucrative market for
Japanese goods in South Korea, while at the same time
negotiating with North Korea for receipt of badly needed
raw materials for Japan's industries in return for low
interest Japanese loans to help invigorate the stalled
North Korean economy. This two Korea policy with respect
to trade relations has worked to achieve Japan's fourth
interest goal of maximizing the possible economic and
political benefits from the Korean land mass as a whole
while at the same time assisting in the achievement of the
second interest.
C. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Moving further to the West - Southwest from Japan lies
the People's Republic of China, the nation that has been
the most dramatic in accentuating Japan's new role in the
region during the past two years. The recent history of
formal Sino- Japanese relations began in 1972, after the
Nixon "shokku" of normalizing US-China relations. Prior to
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this time Japan had been tied to US foreign policy apron
strings and therefore, Tokyo was unable to meet Beijing's
previous demands that the establishment of full diplomatic
relations required Japan to sever ties with Taiwan.
Once these strings were broken, Tokyo proceeded to down-
grade its diplomatic ties with Taiwan by dis-establishing
ambassadorial level relations and opting for cultural and
economic "missions."
For the Japanese, the normalization of Sino- Japanese
relations represents a major success for their new, more
independent foreign policy. Together with the Sino-
American detente the- rapprochment with Beijing considerably
enhanced Japan's national security by promoting an inter-
national environment characterized by negotiations, com-
promise, and flexibility, and by increasing the prospects
for stability among the major actors in the Asian theater.
With respect to Soviet-Japanese relations, the recon-
ciliation with the People's Republic of China is likely
to improve Japan's bargaining position. The USSR was
clearly unhappy about the rapid improvement in Sino-
Japanese relations. For 10 years the Soviet Union had pur-
sued a Dulles-like strategy of containing China in Asia by
building up its ground forces on the Chinese border and its
naval power in the Pacific, while seeking through a variety
of political and economic means to check the expansion of
Chinese influence. Yet the result of that strategy has
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been to leave the Soviet Union in virtual political isola-
•
,
• 106tion in Asia.
Through various heavy handed diplomatic tactics aimed
at discouraging Japan from moving closer to the People's
Republic of China, tactics such as harassment of fishermen,
intransigence on negotiations concerning fishing treaties,
military buildups on the disputed Kurile Islands and out-
right diplomatic warnings, the Soviets only succeeded in
pushing the Japanese to react more positively and swiftly
to the overtures of the Chinese, culminating in the signing
of the 1978 Sino- Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.
This pseudo "alignment" of Japan, China and the US is
reminiscent of the historical proclivity of the Japanese
to align themselves with any power who confronts the
imperialistic drives of the Russians.
Since 1972, economic and cultural ties have been growing
steadily between the two countries. In 1978 alone, China
concluded a $20 billion long-term trade agreement under
which Japan will buy mainly oil and coal while China will
get industrial plants and technology. Also, China in-
creased her importation of Japanese steel to such an extent
(5.5 million metric tons) that it equalled the United
States' imports. This is significant in that the United







These new economic ties, especially in the energy field,
also work to improve Japan's strategic goals vis-a-vis her
dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the extended SLOC that
the delivery of that oil entails. If Japan can secure
another outlet for this vital need closer to home, she will
cut the distance and time involved in shipments and afford
the Maritime Self Defense Forces a more realistic ability
to provide convoy protection should the need ever arise
during a conflict situation. More importantly, it helps
loosen the stranglehold which the OPEC nations have over
the Japanese economy.
Japan's rapidly improving relationship with the People's
Republic should not be seen in terms of a coalition or
alliance. It is best viewed in the context of the fluid
situation in Asia, which demands flexibility and continuous
maneuvering among the principle actors -- the United States,
the USSR, China and Japan. Though Japan clearly is drawn
to China on the basis of an emotionally powerful mixture
of history, common cultural and linguistic roots, and a
sense of shared destiny, a prime objective in furthering its
realtions (both political and economic) with Beijing will
be to improve its bargaining position with the USSR and the
United States. This is not to say that Japan will not value
its relationship with China for its own sake, rather, Japan
will have to (and will prefer to) operate in a multi- lateral
setting rather than in the context of an exclusive bilateral
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alliance with a particular great power, as has been the
-.1. "7H 108case over the past 20 years.
D. SOVIET MILITARY ASCENDENCY IN ASIA
The fourth and final of the major strategic factors on
the Northeast Asian geopolitical scene, but by no means the
least import to the Japanese leadership and people is the
rapid and menacing general buildup of the Soviet military
forces in the Far East, particularly that of the Soviet Far
Eastern Fleet. The Soviet Pacific Fleet currently possesses
a balanced combat force of some 777 warships including 20
main surface combatants, 125 submarines and supply ships,
approximately 510 combat aircraft and two naval infantry
regiments. This force has been growing steadily since 1960
in comparison to the relative decline in numbers of US war-
ships in the area over the same period --a fact which can
109be graphically seen by the chart provided in Appendix F.
This most visible buildup has had a profound impact on
all levels of Japanese society and it is an important
factor when considering the strategic interests of Japan
vis-a-vis the Kurile question, Korea, the People's Republic
of China and, most importantly, the extended Sea Lines of
Communication running southward through the South China Sea
and Westward to the Persian Gulf.
The Russians appear to have copied the United States'
tactic of power projection by utilizing a strong naval
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presence in areas throughout the world as a means of en-
hancing political and strategic objectives within those
areas. There can be little doubt, it is suggested here,
that in the late 1970' s Moscow sees its dramatically ex-
panding sea power as part of an organic, integrated and
cumulative strategy aimed at eroding, challenging and
eventually overcoming the traditional Western command of
the seas. This total maritime strategy and the ultimate
political objectives, transcend any purely regional ambi-
tions of the USSR, whether in the Far East, the Indian
Ocean or the Atlantic. The drive to challenge the Western
command of the seas must be seen overall. Moscow hopes
initially to limit the US capability of reacting to Soviet
advances whether in the Far East or elsewhere. One need
only to look to Afghanistan and Iran to see examples of
this policy.
The Soviets have utilized their maritime supremacy to
pressure the Japanese in and around the Northern Territories
by harassing the Japanese fishing fleets and by the massive
Soviet fishing fleets moving with impunity into the waters
of Hokkaido itself. Their continued infringements of
Japanese air space have been a persistent irritant in
Russo-Japanese relations and the blatant muscle flexing as
exhibited in their many Soviet combined arms military
exercises have caused increased uneasiness within Japanese
society as they watch what they perceive to be US
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retrenchment in Northeast Asia. Of particular importance
is the recent agreement between the Soviets and the
Vietnamese for the use of port facilities in Vietnam, thus
positioning the Soviet fleet athwart the main Persian Gulf-
Japan oil route.
E. EFFECTS CAUSED BY THE CHANGING GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The result of this evolution in the geostrategic en-
vironment surrounding Japan can be seen in the gradual
shift of public opinion within Japan toward a new acceptance
of the need for a strong and effective military establish-
ment. A recent nationwide public opinion poll taken by the
United States International Communication Agency revealed
the following statistics and conclusions.
"Japanese government poll trend measures (Oct 1975
and Dec 1978) have shown small but significant rises in
public acceptance of security ties with the United
States, favorable opinion of the nation's Self Defense
Forces and support for increased defense spending.
As indicated in the following figures... an improve-
ment in the quality of Japan's maritime and air defense
forces is the priority need:
Attitudes .Among the Defense Oriented Toward
Selected Defense Measures
See a Need for Japan to :




Build greater defense capa-
bility independent of US
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Attitudes Among the Defense Oriented Toward
Selected Defense Measures (continued)
See a Need for Japan to : Agree Disagree Don't know
Be able to patrol oil
supply routes in Western
Pacific 56% 24% 21
There has been a gradual but steady rise over the past
10 years in the acceptance of the Self Defense Forces and
the need to provide a strong defense establishment while
opposition of the SDF has steadily declined over the same
period. Appendix G provides a statistical summary of this
question as attained from Japanese Defense Agency public
opinion poll statistics from 1969 to 1978.
In the area of international affairs, Japan since 1972
has been moving slowly but surely in the direction of
taking a more active role in the affairs of the Northeast
Asian region. As Japan restructures its home industrial
base from its less competitive capital intensive industries
to more profitable knowledge intensive areas, such as
computer chips and electronics, it has discovered the need
once more to interact on an international scale with those
nations that have the potential to directly affect the
economic well being of Japan. Japan cannot afford to have
the inflationary trends and recessionary forecast lead to
the reemergence of barriers to trade as happened in the
late 1920 's and early 1930' s. However, where in the imme-
diate postwar era the United States assisted Japan in its
quest for open markets, Japan now finds the same
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protectionist sentiments arising there as in the other
nations of the West. Thus Japan is being forced to
independently translate some of its economic power into
112political power in order to protect its world interests.
One of the major problems which Japan must contend with in
this regard is the legacy of World War II. It is the
general consensus among the Japanese leadership that Japan
must take every opportunity to demonstrate its determination
to be a peaceloving nation and that Japan must therefore
maintain as much of an independent position as possible in
World affairs. It must take care not to become embroiled
in the power game of the United States, the Soviet Union
and China. If it were to do so, it could jeopardize its
continued access to vital raw materials, especially energy
resources, and thus threaten its future survival.
1. The Economic Factor
The first problem facing Japan's leadership in
carrying out their attempt to bring Japan further to the
center of the international stage will be that of recon-
ciling the problems created by Japan's own protectionist
policies regrading the home market place. These policies
have been the most recent cause for dissension between the
US and Japan due to the huge balance of trade imbalance
created between them. This imbalance comes at the same
time as the fall of the dollar from its former position of
superiority in the world.
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Since the beginning of the 1970' s Japan has been
steadily registering huge trade surpluses which reached
their peak in 1978 with a $11,852 million surplus. This
surplus, plus Japan's internal protectionist policies, have
borne the brunt of the United States' criticisms of
Japanese economic policies over the past few years.
Japan has been also criticized for not being a part
of an integrated, geographic trading area such as the EEC,
the US and Canada, and for the composition of its trade in
manufactured goods. The United States points out that
over half the world trade in manufactures consists of ship-
ments of intermediate inputs and that during the period
1955-1973 over half the growth of trade in manufactures was
between North America and Western Europe, rather than among
continents. By virtue of its trade barriers, Japan was
actually insulated from this trade.
Except for its dependence on raw materials, most of
the Japanese economy is self-contained. Its main trading
partners have been the diverse developing countries of the
Pacific Rim, the United States and Southeast Asia. Because
of its geographic position and its trade policies, Japan
did not participate as fully as others in the process of
international sepcialization in manufacturing which occurred
in the 1950's and 1960's. Its imports of manufactures are
unusually low -- about 20% of tis total imports, with
little growth, so that its exports of manufactures contain
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a very high proportion of domestic value added. In addition,
manufactures amount to over 90% of Japanese exports.
In other words, despite the relatively low ratio of
exports to GNP, an unusually large part of the value of
Japanese export production is domestic. The lack of
Japanese participation in world trade in intermediate manu-
factured fooods, and the difficulty in penetrating the
Japanese market encountered by intermediate or final
products, has reduced the benefits that other industrialized
c t ,, 114countries receive from Japanese growth.
In short, the United States wants equity and parity
in its trading relationship with Japan. No longer can the
Japanese justify the protection offered their industries -
the time has long since passed that the Japanese economy
could be considered in "infancy." The United States,
therefore, wants Japan to assume the same responsibilities
as other major trading nations including the opening of its
markets on an equal basis, and the recent efforts on the
part of the Japanese government to reduce these trade
barriers has demonstrated a growing understanding on the
part of the Japanese of the negative responses that are
being generated abroad as a result of these policies and
a willingness toward assuming increased responsibilities
vis-a-vis trade with the United States.
Japan's economic problems however, do not rest
solely with the United States. Whereas Japan has enjoyed
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a wide surplus in its balance of payments account with US
trade, it has registered a steadily increasing deficit
with the oil producing nations which has virtually offset
the gains achieved through trade with the United States.
In 1978 alone, Japan incurred a deficit of $10,032
million in export- import trade with the Middle East. As
shown in Appendix ft, Japanese trade with the Middle East
incurred the widest disparity in import vs export per-
115
centages than with any other trading partner.
2 . Arms and Arms Control
It is this aspect of the Japanese external economy
that has combined with the internal recession to fuel many
of the debates within the government and business communi-
ties on the subject of arms and arms control. As was
shown in Chapter III a renewed campaign was launched in
early 1978 to win more v/idespread public acceptance for
larger defense expenditures and, possibly, a liberalization
of the arms export ban. The campaign has been waged at
all levels, starting with Prime Minister Fukuda's speech
before the National Diet in January and it has increased
in intensity through Diet debates and newspaper editorials.
The Defense Agency White Papers in particular, have become
increasingly more specific in their description of the
threats and dangers facing Japan today. Even more indica-
tive of the changing attitudes amongst the Japanese
leaders was the statement by the then Minister of Defense
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that the Self Defense Forces must pose a potential threat
to likely enemies. Given the limitations posed by Article
9, this statement was seen as particularly provocative by
the opposition parties and it caused a renewed debate on
the question of offensive and defensive forces considered
authorized under the terms of the Japanese Constitution.
Most observers consider that the objective of "desensi-
tizing" the public and of creating a new consensus recog-
nizing the need for defense is being accomplished, as
can be seen in the aforementioned public opinion statistics
However, the success of this effort is far from
certain in that memories of World War II militarism are
still alive in Japanese society. This fact can be seen in
the effects of an October 15, 1980 suggestion on the part
of the Japanese Justice Minister Okuno in the Suzuki
cabinet regarding settling the constitutionality of the
Self Defense forces. Opposition parties and vigilante
groups immediately emitted "howls of protest" criticizing
such statements and/or actions as a shorthand for rearming
Japan and marching down the road to militarism along pre-
World War II lines. In order to calm the climate in the
Diet, the Suzuki government was forced to back peddle on
the issues of arms and arms control which appears to con-





These temporary setbacks notwithstanding, the mounting
criticism of Japan's trade surpluses and Japan's "free
ride" in security matters under US protection has given
defense advocates an extra argument in pressing their case
for increased defense outlays. Even members of the
Centrist Opposition parties in the Diet such as Komeito
and the Democratic Socialists have modified their anti-
defense forces stance in order to accommodate themselves
to the rising tide of public acceptance of the military
modernization and expansion policies and programs now
being proposed.
As was demonstrated in Chapter III, some business-
men are openly advocating greater military spending and
a relaxation of arms exports policies as one method of
remedying the long economic slump being experienced by
Japan's heavy industries. There is a belief on the part of
a large faction of the business community that none of the
government's fiscal policies will be sufficient to pull
Japan out of the slump. One respected business leader has
even gone so far as to state "we need another war somewhere
118
to get out of this depression."
Another argument for an expansion of the domestic
arms industry is that such development is considered to be
essential for a successful transformation of Japanese
industrial structure to an increasingly "knowledge inten-
sive" one. Finally, business circles contend that Japan
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has been hurt by the arms export ban in developing recipro-
cal contracts with Middle East oil producers that would
favorably affect the current Japanese Balance of Payments
deficit in that region of the world. They feel that to
secure a stable supply of energy and other basic resources,
the Japanese must offer something which the exporters want
most -- weapons. Many Japanese businessmen claim to have
lost deals in the Middle East because Japan does not offer
119
arms as a part of their contract negotiations.
These arguments are not new, in that they have been
forwarded off and on since the policy's first enunciation
in 1967. What is new this time, however, is the relative
lack of public outrage which had previously accompanied
any public debate over defense issues.
Prior to 1973 there was widespread public discord
and upheaval whenever attempts were made to modify the
provisions of Japan's peace Constitution. For example,
the debate over the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1960
evoked the largest scale riots ever to explode in Tokyo
and resulted in the cancellation of President Eisenhower's
State visit to Japan. Anti-militarist elements in the
Japanese populace portrayed the Security Treaty as a
betrayal of the peace Constitution, the antithesis of a
120desired neutrality and a dangerous lightning rod for war.
In addition to this outbreak of violence, the
remainder of the 60 's decade witnessed a gradual increase
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in anti-military and anti-defense activism on the part of
the Japanese people. Demonstrations and minor riots
occurred over interpretations of the meaning of the Japan-
US security relationship; over base rights issues; nuclear
powered ship visits; aircraft accidents; and most of all,
over US involvement and Japanese tacit but detached par-
ticipation in the war in Vietnam. It was only after the
1973 oil crisis, and the rise in external and internal
pressures resulting from the newly emerging geostrategic
environment that these attitudes began to change.
3 . Stability, Security and Japan
With the increasing tension being felt throughout
the world as a result of the economic effects of the OPEC
pricing policies, the growing assertiveness and aggres-
siveness of Japan's neighbor the Soviet Union and the
instability in the Third World countries, notably the
Middle East and Southeast Asia, Japan has been feeling an
increasing sense of unease over the stability and security
of its economic lifelines.
This growing perception of threat and danger has
been enhanced by what the Japanese assert to be a weakening
of US resolve in assuming its position as a leader of the
"Free" world in international politics and concern de-
veloped over the credibility of the US defense commitment
as contained in the US- Japan Security Agreement. In a
nationwide public opinion poll conducted in April 1979 by
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the United States International Communications Agency
(USICA) , when asked about their trust in the US defense
commitment the following comment was noted:
"Acceptance of the Security Treaty and the US
obligation to defend Japan, it seems, are not issues
for the bulk of the Japanese public. What is at issue,
however, is the extent of America's actual commitment
(emphasis added) to the defense of Japan.
When asked about their confidence in the US
defense commitment ... 50% say they have at least a
"fair amount" of trust that the US xvould come to the
aid of Japan if its security were threatened by some
other country. About a third (31%) would have little
or no trust in the US in such a situation.
In early 1978, a Yomiuri poll asked whether the
US would "really" defend Japan under the Security
Treaty. It found doubt outweighing belief by a 38%
to 21% margin with 41% expressing no opinion. In
October 1978, an Asahi poll asked whether the US
would defend Japan in "real earnest" and received
negative responses by a 56% to 20% margin. "121
This perception on the part of Japan concerning a
U.S. unwillingness and/or inability to meet all of its
defense commitments toward Japan has caused the Japanese to
question the advisability of relying on the Japan-U.S.
Mutual Security Treaty for the preservation of its peace
and security. The question of US credibility in the face
of an evolving Northeast Asian security was the subject of
an editorial in the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai about
one month after the above USICA opinion poll was taken.
That editorial stated:
"It is natural ... that the Japanese should become
nervous about the noticeable expansion of Soviet
military potential, in accordance with the interna-
tionally established view that the military threat
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means a combination between potential and specific
intention. The Japanese must study at all times,
from a long range point of view, how to preserve
peace and national independence, and endeavor to
establish a national consensus of opinion on this
subject gradually."
Regarding the question of whether the US can be counted
upon, the article goes on to state:
"Frankly speaking, this doubt, which is related
to the very foundation of the Security Treaty means
that the Japanese have come to think that the US now
seems to be unable to mobilize forces for the defense
of Japan... the accumulation of mutual distrust and
misunderstanding (regarding the US XH war strategy)
is itself a factor which is to weaken the deterrent
effect of the Security Treaty. Such a situation is
by no means desirable for both sides."
Regarding what can be done, the editorial posited that
Japan should
"clarify its readiness to do all it can in the fields
of defense and diplomacy and then ask the US about
concrete measures it can take to fulfill its responsi-
bility of defending Japan in accordance with the
Security Treaty. It is not permissable for Japan to
remain idle indefinitely while it lacks oil and other
resources . "122
The tenor of these findings is clearly negative
and what their ultimate impact will be on Japanese policies
related to defense and the defense industries is unclear
at present. However, what is clear is that there are
feelings of stress growing once again in Japanese society
over their concern for their future prosperity. Their past
and how they coped with previous threats to their national
integrity is a matter of record and is therefore, a source






The hypothesis of this paper was that the original
force of the "Three Principles on the Export of Weapons"
has been gradually eroding due to the effects of an eco-
nomic recession in the Japanese defense related industries
and to a change in the Northeast Asian strategic environ-
ment wherein Japan has been forced to move from its rela-
tively passive role in world affairs to a more activist
position in both the economic and military spheres. From
the evidence presented it is clear that by virtue of the
conscious policy of both the government and business
leadership, Japan has in fact been proceeding away from a
strict adherence to the "Three Principles" policy to a more
liberal interpretation much the same as it used to circum-
vent the original intentions of Article 9 of the "Peace"
Constitution.
Japan's adaptive responses to its increasing strategic
vulnerability and sense of isolation in Northeast Asia
appears to be leading away from its previous dependent
relationship with the United States to a more independent
stance in world affairs. It is evident that Japan has
•reached the stage of its development where it finds that it
can no longer remain within the shadow of its postwar
mentor. It has received all the assistance and direction
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that it is capable of absorbing and therefore must impart
a measure of distance so as to continue the developmental
process. The stagnation affecting LDP politics, I believe,
is also, to a certain extent, the result of the inability
of the US-Japan ties to maintain their former closeness.
The increased competition between two economic giants has
caused frictions between two previously close friends which
will necessitate sacrifices on the part of both parties
before the current problems can be effectively solved.
Japan's ability to cope with obstacles to its future
development will call for visionary leadership not only
from the political parties but from business as well. The
political arena has not been able to provide this visionary
leadership of late, a deficiency which I also feel is
connected in some way to the evolutionary process that
Japan has undergone since the end of World War II. While
the United States played the major role in the early post-
war era in the making of Japan's decisions in the interna-
tional theater thereby fostering the growth of the
Japanese economy, it also, to a certain extent, stifled
Japan's political development.
As the title of this paper suggests, Japan is now at
the crossroads. It is facing some of the most crucial
decisions that it has encountered since the prewar days
when they faced the decision whether to go to war or not.
They must choose whether they will move away from that
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previous intimate relationship with the United States. I
do believe that they will modernize and expand their mili-
tary forces to a level sufficient to be able to provide
protection to their Sea Lines of Communication from the
Selat Lombok straits north, to the home islands. I also
contend that they will modernize their forces and provide
them with sufficient power to offer a substantial conven-
tional deterrent capability sufficient to discourage any
attempt to intimidate or invade the home islands.
I believe that they will continue to rely on the techno'
logical sophistication in weaponry of the United States for
their mainline fighter aircraft but that they will continue
to improve upon the basic designs as they have done his-
torically to suit their particular needs. They will also
increase their research and development programs and will
continue to develop their own indigenous arm industries to
displace the current dependence on the United States at
some time in the distant future. If and when the Japanese
do decide to achieve total independence in armaments, they
will have to rescind the "Three Principles on the Export
of Weapons," prior to that point, however, I feel that they
will continue to publicly declare their adherence to them,
while privately circumventing the restriction through
liberal interpretations of the already ambiguous term
124

Given Japan's dependence on the free flow of world
trade for its continued existence as an economic superpower,
I do not subscribe to the fears of some about a resurgence
of Japanese militarism with an attendant threat to world
124peace. I believe that Japan, for realistic geopolitical
and economic reasons, will continue to safeguard its
relationships between the superpowers so as to maintain its
independence of action in world affairs. It will do what
it feels will be in the best interests of Japan as a
sovereign nation and not of Japan, ally of the United
States
.
Whatever Japan's responses will be to the pressures of
international affairs, it is certain that they will be
formed through a close interaction between the government
and the business community with the moderating influence
of an increasingly active general public. In this regard
it will want to maintain all of its options open and to
this extent the "Three Principles on the Export of Weapons"
will remain in force only so long as it serves its purpose
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CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES (1977)
(Percent Distribution)
Agriculture, forestry § fishing ___--_ -11.9
Mining, Quarrying --------0.4
Manufacturing (Incl. defense industries) - -25.1
Electricty, Gas § Water- ---------------0.6
Construction -- ---------9.3
Wholesale/retail trade, restaurants, hotels 22.3
Transport, Storage, Communication -6.4
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate, Business Svcs - - - 3.4
Community, Social and Personal Services 20.5
Others -------- 0.2
Source: OECD/Keidanren and Keizai Koho Center, Japan
Institute for Social and Economic Affairs.


























Country Iron ore copper lead zinc bauxite tin nickle
Japan 98.7 92.2 77.5 62.8 100 98.3 100
France - 99.9 86.5 86.9 24.8 100 100
W. Germany 95.4 99.8 82.5 56.8 100 100 100
UK - 100 99.0 98.6 100 80.6 100
USA 36.6 18.3 39.1 56.4 55.1 100 91.6
Source: Keidanren and Keizai Koho Center, Japan Institute
for Social and Economic Affairs. Some Data About




CHANGES IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
*
(Unit: VI billion. %)





































1955 7.559.0 | 991.5 £-0.3 134.9 -^3.3 1.78 13.61
1960 12.748.0 1.569.7
|
10.6 156.9 0.6 1.23 9.99
1965 28.160.0
!
3.658.1 1 12.4 301.4 9.6 1.07 8.24
1970 72.440.0 1 7.949.8 | 17.9 569.5 17.7 0.79 7.16
1971 84.320.0 | 9.414.3
|
18.4 670.9 17.8 0.30 7.13
1972 90.550.0 1 11.467.7 | 21.3 300.2 I 19.3 0.88 6.98
1973 109.800.0 14,234.1 | 24.6 935.5 i 16.9 0.85 6.55
1974 131.500.0 17.099.4 | 19.7 | 1.093.0 1 16.8 0.83 639
197S 158.500.0 21.233.3 1 24.5 1.327.3
i
21.4 0.84 6.23
1976 168.100.0 24.296.0 1 14.1 1 1.512.4 | 13.9 0.90 6.22
1977 192.850.0 28.514.3
|
17.4 1.690.6 | 11.8 0.88 S.93
1978 210.600.0 34.295.0
|
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CHANGES IN NUMBERS OF MAIN VESSELS OF THE U.S. 7th FLEET
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(US$ million^ i w
USA 24,914 25.5 14,790 18.6
CANADA 1,871 1.9 3,190 4.0
EEC 11,104 11.3 6,072 7.6
AUSTRALIA 2,692 2.7 5,300 6.6
SO. EAST ASIA 23,101 23.6 17,293 21.3
MIDDLE EAST 10,745 11.0 20,777 26.1
LATIN AMERICA 6,620 6.7 3,047 3.8
AFRICA 4,444 4.5 944 1.2
CHINA 3,048 3.1 2,030 2.5
USSR 2,502 2.5 1,441 1.8
TOTAL 97,543 100.0 79,343 100.0
Source: Keidanren and Keizai Koho Center, Japan Institute
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